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Arizona's Inferior Courts
Harold H. Bruff*
For many citizens Arizona's inferior courts provide their primary,
perhaps only, contact with the state's justice system. This Article-
based in large part upon a thorough empirical and personal study of
these lower courts-discusses the role that the courts play, the pro-
cedures that they observe, the qualifications of the personnel they
employ, and the sufficiency of the justice they render. These find-
ings are then evaluated, and recommendations for change are made.
*Assistant Professor of Law, Arizona State University. A.B. 1965, Williams College; LL.B.
1968, Harvard University.
gatfe of Confenis
I. Introduction: A Field Study of Arizona's Inferior Courts ............ 3
II. A Profile of Arizona's Inferior Court Judges ..................... 4
A. Selection, Qualifications, and Salary ........................ 4
B. The Background of the Judges ......................... 5
C. Supervision, Training, and Legal Advice ........... ......... 6
D. Finance, Facilities, and Personnel ......................... 7
E. Distribution of W orkload ................................... 10
III. Civil Cases ..................................................... 12
A. The Nature of the Civil Cases .............................. 12
B. Civil Procedure in Inferior Courts.......................16
1. Venue and Personal Jurisdiction .............. ..... .16
2. Aids for the Civil Litigant ................................ 17
3. Procedure in Civil Trials ................................ 17
4. Amounts Claimed and Awarded at Trial ................... 20
5. Ancillary Proceedings ....................................21
6. Appeals ................................................. 23
IV. Crim inal Cases ................................................. 23
A. The Nature of the Criminal Cases ........................... 23
1. Jurisdiction and Subject Matter ......................... 23
2. Securing the Defendant's Presence ........................ 25
3. C ounsel ................................................. 26
4. Jury Trial ............................................... 26
5. Disposition of the Cases .................................. 28
B. Bail and Sentence Practices ................................. 29
1. B ail .................................................... 29
2. Fines .................................................. 30
3. Jail Term s .............................................. 31
C. Administering the Criminal Cases .......................... 32
D. Criminal Appeals .......................................... 34
E. Coroner's Inquests .......................................... 35
F. Felony Preliminary Hearings ................................ 35
V . Conclusion .................................................... 37
A. An Evaluation of Arizona's Inferior Courts ................ 37
B. Reorganization ............................................. 45
ARIZONA'S INFERIOR COURTS
I. INTRODUcTIOnm A FIFL STUDY OF ARrZONA'S INFEiOR Couwrs
Arizona's inferior courts consist of the justice of the peace courts, existing
in the county structure, and the police courts, existing in the incorporated
cities and towns.' The term "inferior courts" is used in this article in its tech-
nical sense, to indicate that the Justice of the Peace (JP) and the police courts
differ from the superior courts in terms of the qualifications that the law re-
quires of their judges' and in terms of the kinds of cases with which they deal.
Thus, the jurisdiction of the inferior courts, which will be detailed below,' is
limited in criminal cases to misdemeanors and preliminary stages of felonies,
and in civil cases (handled by justices of the peace only) to the lower amounts
in controversy.
The first four sections of this Article summarize the findings of a field study
conducted in August and September, 1972, pursuant to a grant from the
Arizona State Justice Planning Agency. The study was conducted by student
researchers from the Arizona State University College of Law under faculty
supervision. The students traveled throughout Arizona, visiting: as many jus-
tice of the peace courts and police courts as possible, ordinarily missing only
those courts where the judge was on vacation or otherwise unavailable. The
purpose of the visit was twofold: First, to interview the judges at length to
examine the inferior court system from their viewpoint; second, to take a
random sample of cases from their dockets to obtain an overall picture of
the business these courts conduct. The judges were very cooperative; without
their help, the study could not have been made.
At the time of the field study, Arizona had 89 justices of the peace (JP's)
and 59 city magistrates-a total of 148 inferior court judges. Eighteen of the
JP's also served as the city magistrate for a municipality, as permitted by
law.' Interviews were conducted with 76 of the 89 JP's and 44 of the 59
city magistrates, or 120 of the 148 judges. Docket samples were taken from
78 of the justices of the peace and 54 of the city magistrates, or 132 of the
148 total. For purposes of the study, all judges in the Phoenix and Tucson
metropolitan areas (17 JP's and 33 city magistrates) were designated "urban,"'
and those in the remainder of the state were designated "rural."
1. See pp. 4-5 intra.
2. This Article will use the 'term "judges"-the usual form of address-to refer collec-
tively to the presiding officers of the inferior courts. The presiding officers of the
police courts are ordinarily referred to as city magistrates. The statutory qualifications
are set forth at p. 5 infra.
3. See pp. 12, 23-24 infra.
4. Amz. CONST. art. VI, § 32; Aarz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-403(B) (1956).
5. This included, for JP courts, Phoenix (6), Glendale, Mesa (2), Peoria, Scottsdale,
Tempo, Tolleson, and Tucson (4); for police courts, Phoenix (11), Glendale, Mesa
(2), Peoria, Scottsdale, Tempe (2), Tolleson, Paradise Valley, Avondale, Gilbert,
Youngtown, Apache Junction, Tucson (5), and South Tucson (4). Of the urban JP's,
15 of 17 were interviewed, and 16 of 17 dockets were examined. Of the urban
police courts, 22 of 33 judges were interviewed, and all dockets were examined.
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Interviews with the judges followed a standardized questionnaire,' and
the responses were read and computer coded by categories of the most fre-
quent answers. The docket sampling procedure was more complex. May,
1971, was chosen as the test month to ensure that all cases that would ever
reach completion had had sufficient time to do so. Since cases were docketed in
chronological order of filing, a random sample was selected simply by taking
every fifth case for the test month from the following categories of cases
examined: Civil, criminal, traffic,' ordinance, and felony preliminary hearing.
This procedure produced a total statewide sample of 2,800 cases.' These
sample cases and interview responses form the body of empirical data upon
which the following discussion is based.
II. A PROFILE OF ASrZONA'S INFERIOR COURT JUDGES
A. Selection, Qualifications, and Salary
Selection of Arizona's justices of the peace proceeds according to consti-
tutional and statutory mandate. Each county board of supervisors is required
to divide the county into justice precincts, the size and number of which are
within the supervisors' discretion.' The voters of each precinct then elect a
justice of the peace and a constable for four-year terms." Elections for the
office of justice of the peace, unlike those for the judges of Arizona's higher
courts,"1 are partisan in nature. Vacancies are filled by the board of super-
visors." The importance of this appointive power is shown by the fact that
over half (42) of the 76 JP's responding to the survey first assumed office by
appointment to fill a vacancy. By contrast, 27 JP's won a contested election,
and six an uncontested election. Although the law requires every city or
town incorporated under the general laws and having a population greater
than a specified minimum to establish a police court, the manner of selecting
the city magistrate is ordinarily left to the municipality." In some small Arizona
6. A copy of the questionnaire is on file at Law and the Social Order.
7. The great number of traffic cases required a modified procedure. The researchers
sampled only every tenth traffic case for the test month and compiled a maximum
sample of ten cases per court.
8. For those courts in which there were insufficient cases In May 1971, to produce a
sample of five cases per category, earlier cases were added to provide some idea
of what all courts were doing with the cases they handled. Of the total statewide
sample of 2,800 cases, 2,107 were from the prime test month.
9. Aruz. CONST. art. VI, § 32; Anz. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 22-101 (1956). This statute
imposes the limitation, however, that abolition of a precinct may not take place until
the expiration of the term of office of the incumbent JP and constable. See also State
ex rel. Gilmore v. High, 14 Ariz. 429, 130 P. 611 (1913); Am. REv. STAT. ANN. §
11-251(2) (Supp. 1972-73).
10. Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-102 (1956); id. § 22-111 (Supp. 1972-73).
11. See Lee, Judicial Selection and Tenure in Arizona, 1973 LAw & Soc. 0. 51.
12. Anz. RE v. STAT. ANN. § 11-251(16) (Supp. 1972-73). But cf. 1967 Op. Amz.
Arr'Y GEN. No. 16.
13. Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-402, -403, 9-201 (1956). Under id. § 22-402,
charter cities apparently may choose whether or not to establish a police court.
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towns, however, the city recorder is required by statute to be ex officio
police judge."' Of the 44 city magistrates responding to our survey, 42 held
appointive office, one had initially been appointed to an elective office, and
one had won a contested election. Some cities provide that appointed city
magistrates serve at the pleasure of the city council; others provide that the
city council may remove them only for cause."
The statutory qualifications of justices of the peace are that they be 18
years of age or older, residents of the state, electors of the precinct in which
their duties are to be performed, and able to read and write the English
language." They need not be lawyers." City magistrates must be electors of
the municipality in which they serve;" and the cities sometimes impose
additional qualifications-for example, that they be attorneys."'
Salaries of the justices of the peace are paid by the counties, but a statute
requires their compensation to be within specified ranges based on the popu-
lation of the precinct.'" The minimum salary, for precincts with fewer than
1,500 registered voters, is $5,100 to $6,600 per year; the maximum, for pre-
cints with over 7,500 registered voters, is $11,000 to $14,000. Although the
workload of a JP certainly varies with the population of his precinct, the
statutory pay formula does not take into account the presence of other
factors that may greatly affect his caseload, such as the presence of a major
highway within the precinct. Insofar as it does not, judges doing more work
may be paid less than their colleagues.' It may be noted that 11 of the 76
JP's interviewed mentioned low salaries as a problem of the system. Com-
pensation of city magistrates is fixed and paid by the municipality."
B. The Background of the judges
The educational background of Arizona's inferior court judges varies widely.
The largest single group (37.5 percent) of the judges interviewed had com-
pleted high school but had received no further formal education; a few
judges had not completed high school." Twenty percent had had some col-
14. Id. J 9-204. This category of Arizona town has 600 to 800 voters. Id.
15. Compare WiNsLow, ARrz., CODE § 14-27 (1970) with PHOENIX, ARIZ., CODE pt. I, ch.
8, § 3 (1954).
16. Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-402 (Supp. 1972-73), construed in Nicol v. Superior
Court, 106 Ariz. 208, 473 P.2d 455 (1970).
17. State v. Lynch, 107 Ariz. 463, 464, 489 P.2d 697, 698 (1971); Crouch v. Justice of
the Peace Court, 7 Ariz. App. 460, 465, 440 P.2d 1000, 1005 (1968).
18. Amz. CONST. art. VII, § 15.
19. E.g., PHOENIX, Asuz., CODE pt. I, ch. 8, § 6 (1954).
20. AIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-424(B) (Supp. 1972-73).
21. This topic is developed at pp. 10-12 infra.
22. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-403(A) (1956).
23. Six judges indicated they had not finished high school; five of them were JP's.
Thirty-two of the 76 JP s and 13 of 44 city magistrates had only a high school
diploma.
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lege education short of a four-year degree. Another 7.5 percent had attained
a college degree as the highest level. Lawyers comprised another large group
(8 of 76 JP's and 17 of 44 city magistrates, or 21 percent of the total); a few
judges had done some graduate work in other fields. There was a strong
tendency for the judges who were lawyers to be found in the cities, and,
conversely, for the judges with only a high school education to be found in
rural areas. Of the urban judges interviewed, 22 of 37 were lawyers, and
only, 8 of 37 had no more than a high school education. Of the rural judges
interviewed, 3 of 83 were lawyers; 43 of 83 had only a high school education.
Many non-lawyer judges had received law-related training. For instance,
four JP's had attended at least some law school courses, and 24 percent of
all judges cited law-related training in law enforcement. However, 43 percent
of the judges had had no law-related training. The city magistrates had a
significantly. higher total incidence of legal training than the justices of. the
peace: 38 percent of the city magistrates were lawyers, and 59 percent either
were lawyers or had had law-related training; the corresponding figures for
the justices of the peace were 10.5 percent and 42 percent respectively.' The
judges were also asked .how long they had been in office. Eleven percent
indicated less than a year's experience; 42 percent, 1 to 5 years; 27 percent,
6 to 10 years; 20 percent, over 10 years. Five percent of the judges, all of
them JP's, had held office over 20 years.
:Each judge was asked to specify any prior employment experience that
had helped him as a judge. Most frequently mentioned was law. enforcement
experience, cited by 29 percent of the.justices of the peace and .13 percent
of the city magistrates, for a statewide average of 23 percent. The next most
frequent answer was experience in law practice, cited by the judges who
were attorneys. Other prominent categories of experience, each cited by
roughly 10 percent of the judges, included legislative or government service,
business, and "experience with people," often mentioned in connection with
another, more formal, type of experience.
C. Supervision, Training, and Legal Advice
The Arizona Constitution makes the supreme court administrative super-
visor over all the courts of the state, including the inferior courts.", . The
supreme court's supervisory authority, implemented through its office of the
Administrative Director 'of the Courts, has been used to' some' extent to 'train
the inferior court judges and to inform them about legal developments. The
Administrative Director reports that new justices of the peace and city magis-
trates now receive limited training about the time they assume office. Grants
24. The higher percentage of lawyers among the city magistrates is due largely to their
presence in the Phoenix and Tucson police courts.
25. Arz. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
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from the Arizona State Justice Planning Agency are used to send them to
training programs for inferior court judges, run by judicial organizations
located in other states, and lasting from three days to two weeks."6 With one
exception,"' no formalized training program for new inferior court judges has
been carried on within Arizona. The intermittent turnover in these offices
would cause difficulty in administering such a program.
The supreme court's supervisory powers are used in several other ways to
assist the judges. In 1962, the supreme court published the Arizona Manual
for Justice Courts, the stated purpose of which was to provide guidance and
information for the JP's rather than a set of binding general rules. Once a
year, the supreme court orders all inferior court judges to attend a two-day
conference, at which common problems can be discussed and lectures offered.
(JP and magistrate associations also have conventions that offer opportuni-
ties for education.)
The Administrative Director regularly sends the judges new federal and
state court decisions and statutes relating to their work. This dissemination
of information is obviously helpful. Ninety percent of the JP's and 75 percent
of the magistrates indicated that they were kept adequately informed of
changes in the law that affect their work; only 2 JP's and 4 magistrates
answered unequivocally that they were not. Information on changes in law
was said to come from various sources: frequently mentioned were the
Administrative Director, the Secretary of State, and the Attorney General.
Because many of the inferior court judges are not lawyers, they sometimes
desire legal. advice on a pending case. Sixty-four percent of the JP's reported
that they usually consult the. county attorney, while 17 percent said they
usually contact a superior court judge; the magistrates often (39 percent)
consult. the city attorney. However, a large number of magistrates simply
rely on themselves (27 percent). The judges were asked how much of the
.time they were able to obtain legal guidance when they wanted it. State-
wide, 68 percent answered "always or almost always," 12 percent "usually
or. occasionally," and 3 percent "rarely." (The remaining percentage -was
composed of nonresponses' and judges who do not seek outside advice.) Des-
pite these expressed opinions, however, 17 of the judges (12 of them magis-
trates) indicated there was a need for more training and upgrading' of the
inferior court judge's position.
D. Finance, Facilities, and Personnel
Arizona justice of the peace courts and most police courts are forbidden
26. The National College of the State Judiciary, in Nevada, has a Limited Court -Judges
Program- involving a three-day seminar and a two-week course. The American Academy
of Judicial Education, in Alabama, has one- and two-week courses.
27. In January, 1970, because of an extraordinary number of new judges taking office,
the Director obtained funds from the Arizona State Justice Planning Agency and pre-
sented a three-day course for the new judges.
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to operate under the constitutionally invalid fee system, in which the judge's
compensation consists of fees assessed against losing parties." Instead, fines
collected in justice of the peace courts are paid over to the county treasurer'
(or in a few instances to a state agency); fines collected in the police courts
ordinarily go to the city treasurer."2 Thus, fines usually go to the unit of
government creating and maintaining the court-not necessarily to the unit
of government whose law has been broken. For example, fines collected by
city magistrates are paid to the city treasurer without regard to whether
the violation is of state law or city ordinance.
The expense of maintaining the justice of the peace courts is borne by the
counties;31 that of maintaining the police courts, by the cities." State law
controls the amount of a county's expenditure for its JP courts only by estab-
lishing mandatory salary ranges for the judges and for the constables,"
the other required officers. No such controls are placed upon cities' expendi-
tures for their police courts. The Office of the Administrative Director of the
Courts has compiled recent budgetary figures for the inferior courts. Table
I summarizes county budgets for the JP courts and demonstrates that, al-
though these courts take in about as much revenue statewide as is spent
to maintain them, there are significant differences among the counties in
terms of whether revenue exceeds expenditures, or vice versa.
TABLE I"
BuDcETS FOR JUSTICE OF THE PEACE COURTS
Fiscal Year 1971-72
County Revenues Expenditures





28. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-281 (1956)
allows JP's to collect fixed costs in civil cases regardless of the outcome. ARiz. CONST.
art. XXII, § 17 forbids JP's whose precinct includes a town from keepingfees. Airz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1675 (Supp. 1972-73) requires them to pay all fines and
forfeitures to the county, and id. § 22-118 (1956) makes failure to do so a misde-
meanor. Id. § 22-404 requires fines collected in a city that pays the salaries of police
court officers to go to the city treasurer. This latter provision leaves open the possi-
bility that a city not paying the salary of its magistrate could, consistent with state
law, allow the magistrate to operate under the fee system-a procedure that was con-
demned by Tumey.
29. See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1675 (Supp. 1972-73).
30. See id. § 22-404 (1956).
31. Id. § 22-117.
32. Cf. id. §§ 22-402, -404.
33. Id. § 11-424.01 (Supp. 1972-73). For JP's the minimum is $5,100; the maximum,
$14,000. For constables the minimum is $6,000; the maximum, $8,000. The exact
salary figure depends upon the number of registered voters in the precinct.
34. The information compiled in this Table and in Table I1 is on file at the Office of












Fewer figures are available for the police courts, but municipal budgets re-
ported to the Administrative Director reveal a strikingly different pattern from
that of the JP court finances. The picture is almost uniformly one of revenues
far in excess of expenditures. Table II gives examples.
TABLE II
BUDCETS FOR POLICE COURTS
Fiscal Year 1971-72
Municipality Revenues Expenditures









Requiring that the counties and cities maintain the inferior courts causes
wide variation in the quality of the physical facilities and the number of
supporting personnel furnished to the judges. In part, of course, this varia-
tion simply reflects the wide disparities in caseload." The facilities range from
those described by field researchers as "a modem, large city facility" or a
"formal and dignified courtroom" to "a school desk in a corner of the police
office." In some cases offices were used conjunctively with other local offi-
cials, with "no judicial atmosphere whatever." Many of the adequate facilities
were not new but did allow the judges to conduct trials and other business
in an atmosphere of privacy and dignity. Not all of Arizona's inferior court
judges are given this opportunity. Thirty-seven percent of the judges visited
had some type of courtroom, 34 percent had a courtroom-office combination,
and 20 percent had an office only. Seven judges (6 percent) held court at
their homes. When the judges were asked what their main day-to-day prob-
lems were, they gave as their most frequent single answer (32 judges)
inadequate facilities and personnel.
The number of clerical personnel provided to judges differs significantly.
35. See pp. 10-12 infra.
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Sixteen of the 76 justices of the peace interviewed (21 percent) had no
clerical help and kept their own records. Fewer magistrates had no clerical
help. Statewide, 58 percent of the judges relied for help in record keeping
on one full-time clerk or less.
E. Distribution of the Workload
The territorial jurisdiction of a justice of the peace court often overlaps
that of a police court within the JP's precinct. Each justice of the peace
has jurisdiction over minor crimes committed within his precinct,"' which
includes violations of city ordinances unless the city provides that its police
court shall have exclusive jurisdiction over them." Similarly, each city magis-
trate has jurisdiction not only of ordinance violations, but of violations of
state law committed within the city limits."' (The JFs also have jurisdiction
in some subject matter areas where the magistrates have none-civil cases
and coroner's inquests.) Forty-one percent of the JP's interviewed shared
criminal jurisdiction with a single police court within their precincts. Five
more JP precincts included two police courts, and three precincts included
an Indian tribal court.
When asked if there were any informal arrangements dividing up the
concurrent jurisdiction, about half the judges responded that the city police
cited violations within city limits exclusively to the police court. Whether
or not this practice leads to an efficient division of labor between these courts,
the reason for it is obvious, since fines collected in police court go to the city.
Each judge was asked whether he thought there was an efficient distri-
bution of labor between the courts acting within his area. Virtually all city
magistrates responding to the question (34 of 36) felt the division of labor
was efficient; 28 of the 44 justices of the peace whose precinct included a
police court agreed. Some of the judges felt that the presence of a police court
within the precinct was unnecessary. The JP's were also asked whether they
felt the boundary lines of their precincts were well-drawn. Seventy percent
answered affirmatively; the others had a variety of complaints ranging from
the extreme size of the precinct (8 percent) to the inclusion of citizens
voting in another precinct. A common complaint (8 percent) was the setting
of precinct lines in a manner which made it difficult to tell which JP had
jurisdiction over a given crime-for instance, a boundary down the middle
of a highway or a river.
Apart from the division of labor between justice of the peace courts and
police courts within the same precinct, there are great differences in workload
in different parts of Arizona. When asked about their day-to-day problems,
36. Am. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-301 (Supp. 1972-73).
37. Seeid. § 22-402(B) (1956).
38. Id.
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16 of 76 JP's and 10 of 44 city magistrates cited case overloads (the third
most frequent response to this question). This problem is reflected in the
judges' estimates of hours worked per week: 54 percent of the JP's and 11
percent of the magistrates indicated a workweek in excess of 50 hours,
and an additional 17 percent of the JP's and 25 percent of the magistrates
said they put in 41 to 50 hours. In contrast, 7 percent of the JP's and 36
percent of the magistrates indicated a workweek of less than 20 hours. One
JP and eight magistrates said they spent less than 10 hours a week on the
job.
Differences in caseload are graphically illustrated by variations in the
number of cases filed in various courts during the test month of May, 1971.
Some urban -justice of the peace courts had large numbers of cases. For
instance, in one Tucson JP court, 894 traffic cases, 80 civil cases, 34 criminal
misdemeanors, and six ordinance cases were filed in the test month, and
18 felony preliminary hearings were held. High caseloads were not confined
to the Phoenix and Tucson area JP's, however. During the test month, 803
traffic cases were filed in Kingman's JP court, as well as 38 misdemeanors
and eight civil cases; eight preliminary hearings also were held. Predictably,
heavy caseloads followed the major highways, not the population of the
area. The JP court in Parker had 232 traffic cases in the month and 199
criminal misdemeanors, most of them boating offenses on the Colorado River.
Sanders had 171 traffic cases; Bowie had 160. Caseloads in the police courts
also were high in the big cities and along the highways. Phoenix's city court,
with 11 magistrates, had 23,066 traffic cases filed during the month; Scotts-
dale, 817; Winslow, 286; Huachuca City, 132.
In stark contrast, some other rural justice of the peace and police courts
do very little business at all. The JP in Cane Beds had 12 traffic cases in
the test month and had had no civil cases in 14 years. The McNary JP, during
the same period, handled one traffic case, five criminal misdemeanors, and
one preliminary hearing. No civil cases had been filed since July of the pre-
vious year. -The Eagar police court had five traffic cases for the month,
and no others. In some areas, both a JP court and a police court existed
despite a paucity of cases. Examples include Springerville, where the JP
handled 15 traffic cases, 23 misdemeanors, and two preliminary hearings,
while the magistrate had one ordinance case; and Duncan, where the JP
had seven traffic cases, three misdemeanors, and two coroner's inquests, while
the magistrate had two traffic cases and one misdemeanor.
The salaries paid the judges do not adequately reflect differences in their
caseloads. The justice of the peace courts mentioned as examples of case-
load variations can also serve to illustrate salary variances. Recent salary
figures for the busy courts were reported as follows: Kingman, $7,800 a
1973:1]
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year; Parker, $7,200; Bowie, $6,600; Sanders, $5,400. Justices of the peace
with very little business were not paid substantially lower salaries: Cane Beds,
$5,100; McNary, $5,100; Springerville, $5,400; Duncan, $5,640. In fact, the
JP in Duncan was paid more than the JP in Sanders, who had a much greater
workload. Salary figures for the city magistrates are not readily available at
present. But for two of the high volume police courts mentioned above,
Scottsdale and Winslow, they were recently reported as $19,920 and $6,651,
respectively."
III. CrvUL CASES
A. The Nature of the Civil Cases
In Arizona's inferior court system, justice of the peace courts have juris-
diction of civil cases, but police courts do not.'* By statute, the JP courts
have exclusive jurisdiction of civil cases in which there is less than $500 in
controversy; they have concurrent jurisdiction with the superior court in
cases involving amounts from $500 to $1,000. A constitutional amendment
adopted at the November, 1972, general election raised the superior courts
minimum jurisdictional level to $1,000 for most kinds of ordinary civil dam-
age suits, except where no other court has exclusive jurisdiction. 1 This amend-
ment apparently confirms the above statutory pattern of concurrent juris-
diction of civil suits for damages when there is between $500 and $1,000 in
controversy. Cases of forcible entry and detainer make up the major excep-
tion to the pattern. For these, the superior court still has concurrent juris-
diction without a minimum jurisdictional amount, and the jurisdiction of the
JP's ends when the rental value of the property exceeds $500 per month,
the damages claimed exceed $1,000, or the right of title to the property, as
opposed to possession, comes into question."
The field study on which this article is based sampled a total of 556 civil
cases from the dockets of Arizona's justices of the peace. Most of these cases
(57 percent) were suits by sellers of goods or services to collect money due
on their contracts. In contrast, suits by buyers in this category, for breach of
warranty or other seller's default, comprised only 3 percent of the cases.
These contract cases appeared with about the same frequency in both urban
and rural samples. The next most frequent categories of cases concerned
property damage (6 percent), loan payments due (6 percent), and forcible
entry and detainer (6 percent). Cases in these categories appeared in the
39. This Information is on file at the Office of the Administrative Director of the Courts.
40. AIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-201 (Supp. 1972-73); id. § 22-402(B) (1956).
41. AIuz. CONST. art. VI, § 14. Exceptions to the minimum jurisdictional amount include
cases in which the title to real property is in uestion, cases challenging the validity
of taxes, and the categories of nuisance, probate, divorce, and naturalization. See
Am. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-201 (Supp. 1972-73).
42. See A=z. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-201(C), (D) (Supp. 1972-73).
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urban courts about 2 percent more frequently than the statewide average,
whereas those in the rural courts ran 2 to 4 percent below the statewide aver-
age.' Of the remaining 20 percent of the cases, 17 percent were classified
"unidentified" by the researchers, indicating uninformative record-keeping in
the courts, and possibly indicating that the above categorical frequencies are
actually understated."
The civil plaintiffs, on a statewide basis, fell into the following major
categories: individuals, 34 percent; corporations, 30 percent; unincorporated
businesses, 29 percent. Significantly, although individuals made up the larg-
est single category of plaintiffs statewide, they were not the largest class
in either the urban or the rural courts taken separately. In the urban JP
courts, corporations constituted 41 percent of the total; individuals, 38 per-
cent; unincorporated businesses, 17 percent. In the rural courts, unincorporated
businesses made up 44 percent of the plaintiffs, individuals, 29 percent, and
corporations, 16 percent. Statewide, business plaintiffs, both incorporated
and unincorporated, made up 59 percent of the total number of plaintiffs,
although the breakdown between the two categories differed sharply be-
tween urban and rural JP courts.
This state of affairs was generally confirmed by the judges' own impres-
sions. The JP's were asked what percentage of their civil plaintiffs the
above groups represent, and the estimates generally agreed with the sample
figures, with significant groups of judges, probably in the rural areas, esti-
mating that over half their plaintiffs were unincorporated business pro-
prietors (26 percent) or individuals (18 percent). The judges were also
asked what percentage of their civil plaintiffs collection agencies and finance
companies alone represent. Four percent of the judges answered that the
collection agencies and finance companies alone represent at least 75 percent
of their civil plaintiffs; 9 percent answered that they comprised 50 percent or
more of the plaintiffs; 12 percent that they comprised 20 percent or more
of the plaintiffs. Thus, in every fourth JP court, collection agencies and finance
companies were estimated to be at least 20 percent of all plaintiffs.
The civil defendants throughout the state, in contrast to the plaintiffs,
were 86 percent individuals, with only minor percentage differences between
rural and urban areas. As might be expected, the business defendants, who
made up the remainder, were more frequently corporations in the urban
areas and more frequently unincorporated businesses in the rural areas, in
each case by several percentage points. Again the impressions of the judges
43. Of the total sam le of 556 cases, 55 percent came from the urban JP courts. It
should be remembered, however, that 16 of 17 urban JP dockets were examined,
compared with only 60 of 72 rural JP dockets. Still, the indication of a higher con-
centration of civil cases in the urban areas remains strong.
44. In the rural areas, 29 percent of the cases were unidentified, indicating less complete
records.
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confirmed the sample. Just over one-half of the judges (51 percent) esti-
mated that individuals comprised 90 percent or more of the defendants; 75
percent of the judges thought that individuals were at least one-half of the
defendants. The judges made no significant mention of collection agencies
and finance companies as defendants, and only 7 percent of the judges
thought that businessmen were a majority of their defendants.
In most civil trials in Arizona justice of the peace courts, neither side has
a lawyer. And when any lawyer is present, usually only the plaintiff is rep-
resented. The sample cases indicated that lawyers appeared solely for the
plaintiff in 30 percent of the cases, solely for the defendant in 1 percent of
the cases, and for both parties in 8 percent of the cases." This participation
by lawyers in 39 percent of the civil cases is largely due to their much more
frequent presence in the urban JP courts than in the rural ones. Lawyers
appeared in 58 percent of the urban cases but in only 14 percent of the rural
cases. Representation solely of the plaintiff was much more frequent in the
urban courts-46 percent, compared with 10 percent in the rural courts.
Representation of only the defendants was rare everywhere, and even rarer
in rural areas. Representation of both sides was found in 11 percent of urban
cases, but in less than 4 percent of rural cases.
Jury trials in civil cases were surprisingly rare. Only 3.6 percent of the
sample cases involved a jury trial, although either party is entitled to a jury
on demand, without regard to the amount in controversy.' All the sample
cases involving a jury occurred in urban courts."
Reviewing the disposition of the sample cases produced at least one strik-
ing statistic. Fully 31 percent of the cases filed in May, 1971, were still pend-
ing at the time the field researchers examined the dockets, some 15 months
later. There were fewer of these open cases in the urban courts (26 percent)
than in the rural ones (37 percent). It seems most unlikely that these cases
simply had not had an opportunity to come to trial, since the average elapsed
time from complaint to trial in all decided civil cases was 59 days, far under
the 15 months elapsed for the cases still pending.' Also, at least one-half
of the judges have no formal procedure for reviewing and disposing of old
cases on the docket.
The JP's were asked to indicate the portion of their technically pending
cases a year or more old that had actually been resolved. Twenty-six percent
45. This preponderance of representation solely for the plaintiff is partly due to the
fact that many of the cases are defaults or are still technically pending-the defendant
never appears at all. Also, corporations may not appear in court in Arizona except
through an attorney. See Ramada Inns, Inc. v. Lane and Bird Advertising, Inc., 102
Ariz. 127, 426 P.2d 395 (1967).
46. Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-220(B) (1956).
47. Jury selection procedures are discussed at p. 20 infra.
48. The urban courts averaged 70 days from complaint to trial; the rural courts, 37 days.
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thought that "substantially all" had been resolved, and an additional 29
percent thought that "many" or "most" of the cases were no longer active.
Only 11 percent of the judges thought that only "some" or "a few" had been
resolved. The JP's were further asked whether they had ever had occasion
to check old cases to see what was happening, and, if so, whether indications
were that the defendants were paying the claim, or fleeing, or otherwise
avoiding payment. Thirty-eight percent of the JP's indicated they had not
investigated the old cases; another 13 percent indicated they had investigated
or had a procedure for dismissing old cases, but did not express an opinion
regarding what had happened in them. Just over 30 percent of the JP's,
however, thought that the defendants usually were paying or settling these
claims. Only one judge thought that open cases usually indicated the de-
fendant had fled; 5 percent thought the results were divided between
settlement and flight.
It seems likely, then, that a large but unknown proportion of these old
open cases, making up 31 percent of the civil total, have actually been re-
solved partly or entirely in favor of the plaintiffs by settlement or payment.
In addition to the pending cases, a full 25 percent of cases statewide resulted
in default judgments because the defendant did not appear at trial. Defaults
were more common in urban courts (32 percent to 17 percent). Fully con-
tested trials were thus rare. Plaintiffs received a contested judgment in 14.4
percent of all civil cases and won slightly more often in rural than in urban
courts (16 percent to 13 percent). Defendants won a contested judgment
in 4 percent of the cases statewide and won slightly more often in urban
than in rural courts (5 percent to 3 percent). Defendants also secured dis-
missals before trial in 11 percent of the cases, indicating a settlement of some
kind-not necessarily, of course, a victory for the defendant. The judges dis-
missed another 7 percent of the cases for failure to prosecute, indicating that
a dismissal procedure for old cases is utilized. These dismissals occurred
mainly in the urban courts.
These figures as a whole, then, indicate that the plaintiff prevailed a
minimum of 50 percent of the time (counting defaults plus contested victor-
ies) and a maximum of 96 percent of the time (assuming that all open cases,
voluntary dismissals, and dismissals for nonprosecution occurred because
the plaintiff's claims had been paid). The figures also indicate that most of
these cases are resolved by the parties rather than by the judge: only 18.5
percent of the cases resulted in a judgment after a contested trial, with the
plaintiff winning 78 percent of them.
It also seems probable that the plaintiffs' actual rate of success in obtain-
ing partial or complete payment of claims filed is quite high, although it is
surely significantly lower than the theoretical maximum of 96 percent. If,
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for instance, plaintiffs succeed in only half the open cases and dismissals
before trial-a ratio that is conservative in terms of the judges' estimates for
the open cases-the plaintiffs' total rate of successes would be 65 percent.
Since only about 1 percent of the cases are appealed, whatever occurs at the
JP court level is usually final.
If there is a "typical' civil case in the justice of the peace court, it is
probably one in which a business plaintiff, possibly represented by a lawyer,
sues an unrepresented individual to recover a contract debt. The "typicar'
result is a settlement out of court, a default judgment in the plaintiff's favor,
or, occasionally, a contested case without a jury, in which the plaintiff can
have a strong expectation of victory.
B. Civil Procedure in Inferior Courts
1. Venue and Personal Jurisdiction
In Arizona JP courts, a defendant generally must be sued in the justice
precinct in which he lives.4" There are numerous exceptions to this rule, how-
ever. The most important one for justice of the peace courts provides that
contract claims may be brought in the precinct where the contract was
entered into, as well as the one where the defendant lives." Thus, some
contracts initiated by mail orders or door-to-door salesmen may be regarded
as entered into at the seller's home office, perhaps far from where the de-
fendant lives. Defense of a suit brought by the seller could be very difficult
for a buyer who would have to travel to the precinct where the home office
is located.
The field researchers attempted to discover whether such suits were fre-
quent in Arizona. ' In almost half the cases sampled, the researchers were
unable to discern the defendant's residence from the court dockets. Of the
remaining cases, most suits were against residents of the precinct or city (29
percent), or residents of the county (18 percent). A few (4 percent) were
against defendants who were not residents of the county but were residents
of Arizona. The judges were asked whether they had many suits against
people not living in the precinct and, if so, whether they occurred in any
particular kinds of cases. Over 70 percent answered that such suits were not
frequent; but 14 percent, in contrast, answered that such suits were frequent
in their precincts. Only about one-third of the judges giving the latter answer,
however, indicated that the suits against nonresidents were by businesses
49. ARuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-401 (Supp. 1972-73); id. § 22-202 (1956).
50. Id. § 22-202(D). Another exception is that persons contracting debts in one county
or precinct, and then moving to another, may be sued in any precinct of the county
in which they are presently located. Compare id. § 22-202(C) (1956) with id.
§ 12-401(4) (Supp. 1972-73).
51. In California, such suits are said to have been common. See Note, The California
Small Claims Court, 52 CALIF. L. REv. 876, 889 (1964).
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suing on long-distance contracts. Such a practice, therefore, seems rather
uncommon in Arizona.
The civil summons"t is often served by a private process server in Arizona's
urban areas (68 percent of the cases), but seldom (4 percent) in rural areas.
Instead, the constable or another law enforcement officer is used. The
dockets indicated that the constables were almost always successful in even-
tually making service of process (about 90 percent statewide). When asked
whether they had encountered any problems with service of process, 76 per-
cent of the judges answered that they had not; 17 percent, that they did have
some difficulties in securing service. Fifty-one percent disfavored the idea
of registered mail service in place of personal service; 29 percent preferred it;
the rest were noncommittal.
2. Aids for the Civil Litigant
A civil litigant can commence a case in justice of the peace court by an
oral pleading, summarized by the judge in his docket. 3 Only certain tech-
nical defenses necessitate a written answer. The judges were asked how a
citizen finds out the proper way to proceed with a lawsuit or defense, and
the most common response (49 percent) was that the judge would help the
litigant with whatever forms the court used. (Most courts (71 percent) kept
a full range of legal forms on hand; some (20 percent) kept basic forms only;
a few (5 percent) kept none. Ninety percent had no forms in Spanish.)
Two judges said they advised a litigant to hire a lawyer when the case war-
ranted one. Another 24 percent of the judges answered that the clerk would
help with forms. However, 20 percent of the judges said that court personnel
would not offer advice in filling out forms or answer other questions con-
cerning how to proceed. Most of these respondents said that a litigant need-
ing advice should retain a lawyer.
3. Procedure in Civil Trials
Arizona law provides that the procedural rules for the superior court,
insofar as they are applicable, shall govern the justice courts in civil cases."
Since few justices of the peace are lawyers, their management of trials is ob-
viously more informal than superior court judges'. Nevertheless, litigants retain
the important procedural right to subpoena witnesses from within the county."
52. See ARmz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-214 (1956).
53. Id. § 22-215.
54. Id. § 22-216. The time in which an answer is to be filed depends upon where the
summons is served. If it is served in the precinct, 5 days is allowed; if in the
county but outside the precinct, 10 days; if outside the county, 15 days; in all other
cases 20 days is the time provided. Id. § 22-213.
55. Id. § 22-211.
56. Id. § 22-217.
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Interestingly, when the justices of the peace were asked what kinds of cases
they least enjoyed, their most frequent answer (26 percent) by a substantial
margin was civil cases. Some judges indicated a reason, such as their un-
familiarity with civil cases, or the tendency of civil litigation to become
complicated.
The judges were also asked how they would handle civil litigants who
became disorderly during a trial. The most frequent answer was that they
would punish the person for contempt by fining or jailing him (22 percent).
The next most frequent answers were that the judge would rebuke the party
and threaten contempt sanctions (17 percent), or have him removed from
the premises (14 percent). Almost one-third of the judges. were unsure of
what action they would take or simply indicated that disorderly litigants
had never been a problem. When asked whether they felt they possessed the
power of contempt in civil cases, the judges gave three answers in almost
equal proportions. One-third had the clear impression that the power existed;
another had the equally clear impression that it did not; the other third
expressed doubt. The Arizona Supreme Court's Manual for Justice Courts
informs the judges that the question of a JP's authority in this regard is both
doubtful and complicated.'
The justices of the peace were asked numerous questions designed to dis-
cover their opinions on how active a role they should play in a civil trial.
First, the researchers asked each judge whether he actively tries to get liti-
gants to settle their dispute without trial. Nearly half the judges (48 percent)
said they "always" encourage settlements. Five JFs (7 percent) said they
even screen cases at the time of filing, urging plaintiffs to try to obtain
satisfaction without filing a suit." An additional 18 percent of the JP's said
they "usually" encourage settlement, giving a cumulative total of some 74
percent of the judges who have a reasonably well-defined practice of doing
so. In contrast, 9 percent of. the. judges indicated that they followed no such
practice, some feeling that it would be inappropriate, some desiring to hear
both sides.
An Arizona statute"' specifies the procedure to be followed in civil cases
when the defendant defaults. If there is a document supporting the claim
in a precise amount (such as an account record), the judge is to give judg-
ment for the amount claimed, even if the plaintiff is not present. If there is
no document proving the claim in a precise amount, however, the judge
must hear testimony from the plaintiff proving damages or, in his absence,
57. C. SMrrH, ASUZONA MANUA.L FOR JuscE CoutrTs 7-8 (1962). See Ax=. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 12-864, 13-341, 13-1226 (1956).
58. This latter practice obviously may affect the figures reported above regarding the
disposition of cases. See pp. 14-16 supra.
59. A=z. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-218 (1956).
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dismiss the case. Most Arizona justices of the peace make a practice of ques-
tioning the plaintiff on the validity and amount of his claim whenever he is
present, even if he has documentary proof. One-half of the JP's interviewed
said they "always and extensively" inquire into the matter; another 14 percent
said that they "usually" do so. Nine percent said they do not go beyond the
statutory requirements, some indicating that extensive inquiry into a default
claim is "not my function."
The judges were asked to state their opinions regarding whether civil
plaintiffs are usually better educated or more familiar with court proceed-
ings than civil defendants. One-third of the JP's had no opinion; 41 percent
thought that plaintiffs have an advantage; 1 percent thought that de-
fendants have an advantage; 12 percent thought that the parties are generally
evenly matched. This tendency on the part of the judges to feel that plain-
tiffs are better educated, or at least more familiar with court procedures,
is probably due to the fact that most plaintiffs are businessmen and are fre-
quently represented by lawyers.
California seeks to ensure equality between the parties by forbidding
lawyers to appear in its small claims courts."0 Such a provision raises prob-
lems, however. For example, nonlawyer businessmen may still attain familiar-
ity with court procedures if they frequently sue to collect debts. Individual
defendants cannot then offset their disadvantage by retaining a lawyer. The
difficulty of dealing fairly with cases involving plaintiffs who are not lawyers,
but who are expert in small claims procedures, is greatest when collection
agencies buy up bad debts and sue on them in great numbers. California
attempts to prevent this practice by forbidding anyone who has been assigned
another person's claim to sue in small claims court." Some states go so far
as to forbid' corporations, associations, or partnerships from suing in their
small claims courts. "' Arizona has none of these restrictions. Despite any of
them, of course, an individual businessman having frequent occasion to
resort to justice of the peace courts would still have an advantage over a
defendant who had not often appeared in court.
The field researchers asked the justices of the peace what they did when
the parties were not evenly matched at trial-whether, for instance, the
judges ever actively sought to bring out the other side of a case if only one
party had a lawyer. Most of the judges (63 percent) answered that they
always or usually try to develop the case of the weaker party in these cir-
cumstances. Another 9 percent said that they sometimes do so. Eighteen
60. CAL. Crv. P. CODE § 117(g) (West 1954), as amended, (Supp. 1972); see Note,
supra note 51, at 878.
61. CAL. Crv. P. CODE § 117(f) (West 1954), as amended, Supp. 1972).
62. See Note, supra note 51, at 878. See also Carlin & Howard, Legal Representation and
Class Justice, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 381, 421-23 (1965); Note, Small Claims Courts as
Collection Agencies, 4 STAN. L. REv. 237 (1952).
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percent of the judges answered that they never or rarely depart from a
strictly impassive role, most of these judges indicating that active question-
ing to bring out the undeveloped side of a case was not the judge's proper
function. Incidentally, in the case of the party most disadvantaged at trial,
the non-English-speaking person, over three-quarters of the judges answered
that regular provision for interpreting was made. Usually, interpreters were
on call, or someone on the court staff was used. Where the problem was
described as infrequent, the judges said either that arrangements were made,
or that the litigants would have to bring an interpreter with them (4 percent).
Juries in civil cases are very rare in JP court (3.6 percent) despite the
fact that either party may have one in any case upon demand." In civil cases
before justices of the peace, the jury now ordinarily consists of six persons,
five of whom must concur to render a verdict." The sheriff or constable sum-
mons the jurors from among the eligible persons residing in the precinct."
The JPs, however, use varying methods of determining which people to
summon. Twenty-six percent of the judges indicated that they made random
selections from the list of registered voters. Another 18 percent said that the
sheriff or constable kept a list from which jurors were called. Eight percent
of the judges said that they simply rounded up available people. This in-
formality may be due to the rarity of jury trials. Fully 37 percent of the
judges had no set procedures for jury selection because they had too few
jury trials (or none at all) to warrant the time expenditure. Once the jury is
summoned in JP court, the parties have challenges for cause and peremptory
challenges." The JP is forbidden to instruct juries on the law in civil cases."
4. Amounts Claimed and Awarded at Trial
When the field survey upon which this report is based took place, the
JP's had exclusive jurisdiction only of cases involving less than $200; they had
concurrent jurisdiction with the superior court of cases involving $200 to
$500. The exclusive jurisdiction of JP courts has now been raised to $500."
Under the old statute, 61 percent of the cases filed concerned amounts of
less than $200 and therefore were within the area of exclusive jurisdiction.
The remaining 39 percent of the caseload, of course, was in the range in
which the superior court then shared jurisdiction but no longer does. Under
the new law, the JP's are required to handle all of the cases in this range,
63. See p. 14 supra.
64. Aiuz. CoNs-P. art. ii, § 23 (adopted at the 1972 general election); Aiuz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 21-102(D) (Supp. 1972-73). The parties may agree under the new statute
to try the case with or receive a verdict concurred in by a lesser number. Id. I
21-102(E).
65. Axrz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 21-332 (1956).
66. Id. § 22-223(B).
67. Id. § 22-211.
68. Id. § 22-201(B) (Supp. 1972-73).
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including those formerly taken to superior court, as well as many cases in
the $500 to $1,000 range. The added burden may well be substantial.
Eighty-nine percent of the judgments awarded were for $300 or less, and
judgments for $51-$100 accounted for fully 50 percent of the awards. In 80
percent of the cases in which judgment was given, the plaintiff received
the amount asked. In the remaining cases, claims that exceeded the final
judgment were twice as frequent as judgments that exceeded claims. In
almost 90 percent of the civil cases, no claim for attorney's fees was indi-
cated. When attorney's fees were claimed, however, some amount was granted
in 28 of the 30 sample cases. In 18 of these cases the file contained a contract
document providing for the payment of attorney's fees should a lawsuit
arise. Court costs in civil cases are set at quite low amounts by statute."
5. Ancillary Proceedings
To institute attachment proceedings in Arizona justice of the peace courts,
the plaintiff files an affidavit claiming that the defendant is indebted to him
upon an unsecured contract and that unsuccessful demand has been made
for the money, or, in the alternative, that the defendant is about to remove
his property to defeat the plaintiffs attempt to collect a judgment in a pend-
ing damage action."0 If the affidavit is accompanied by the plaintiffs bond
in an amount not less than the amount claimed, to protect the defendant
against wrongful attachment," the justice of the peace must issue a writ to
the sheriff or constable commanding him to seize enough of the defendant's
property to satisfy the plaintiffs claim and to keep it in custody until the
matter is determined at trial."' The defendant may regain his property before
trial by posting a bond in an amount calculated to protect the plaintiff's
claim."
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Fuentes v. Shevin,"' handed
down two months before the field study, cast severe doubt on the constitu-
tionality of this procedure since the defendant has no opportunity to be heard
before his property is subject to seizure. Attachment proceedings must be
rare in Arizona JP courts: none were found in the cases sampled. Nevertheless,
the judges were asked whether they would allow attachment before trial or
before the defendant had some other opportunity to appear. Sixty-four per-
69. Id. § 22-281 (1956).
70. Id. §§ 12-1521,-1522.
71. See id. § 12-1524.
72. Id. §§ 12-1526,-1530.
73. Id. § 12-1536.
74. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). Fuentes was decided on June 12, 1972. In Roofing
Wholesale Co. v. Palmer, 108 Ariz. 508, 502 P.2d 1327 (1972), the Arizona Supreme
Court upheld the attachment statutes. But see Western Coach Corp. v. Shreve, 344
F. Supp. 1136 (D. Ariz. 1972), aff'd, 475 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1973) which reaches
the opposite result concerning the similar garnishment laws.
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cent of the judges answered that they would not allow attachment without a
hearing; 17 percent said they would. The others, did not answer directly but
often indicated that attachment had not been sought in their courts.
The Arizona garnishment statutes specify procedures similar to attach-
ment. The plaintiff files an affidavit claiming the existence of an unsatisfied
debt or judgment and alleging that the defendant does not have in his
possession sufficient property subject to execution to satisfy the debt or
judgment. ' The justice of the peace must then issue the writ." The defendant
can release the garnishment by filing a bond in an amount usually greater
than the plaintiff's claim." An Arizona statute entitles the defendant to exempt
half his wages from garnishment if necessary to support his family.,"
There are several ways in which a literal application of Arizona's garnish-
ment laws could contravene federal statutory or constitutional law. Under
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.," any wage garnishment without a prior
hearing is unconstitutional. Even after a hearing, garnishment of more than
25 percent of a debtor's wages violates federal statutory limits 'on wage
garnishment." And pre-hearing garnishment of debts other than wages is of
dubious constitutionality in light of Fuentes. The field researchers found
garnishment attempts in 11 percent (63 cases) of the civil cases that they
sampled; in slightly over one-half (33) the garnishment attempt occurred
after a hearing had been held. It was granted in all but one of these cases.
In the other cases(30), garnishment was sought;prior to an opportunity for
the defendant to appear. It was granted in all of. them.
The test month of May, 1971, preceded Fuentes, which cast doubt on
all pre-hearing garnishment, but.was after Sniadach, which held that wage
garnishment is unconstitutional without a hearing. Most Arizona justices of
the peace (74 percent) reported that they no longer allow garnishment in
any case without a hearing. Only 9 percent stated that they still would allow
garnishment without -a hearing; and the remainder did not give a definite
response to the question. Although researchers identified 52 percent of the
garnishment cases as involving wages,. the data did not reveal how many of
these cases featured hearings before garnishment.
The judges were generally aware of the federal statute limiting wage
garnishment. Eighty percent of them said they would not allow garnishment
of more than 25 percent of a. person's wages. Three judges, however, followed-
75. Aaz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-1571 (1956). When the plaintiff has not yet gained
a judgment, a bond is required to protect the defendant against wrongful garnish-
ment. Id. § 12-1572.
76. Id. § 12-1574.
77Ald. § 12-1578(B).
78. Id. § 12-1594(A).
79: 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
80. 15 U.S.C. J§ 1671-77 (1970).
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the Arizona statutory practice of allowing 50 percent-perhaps more if no
exemption claim were filed. Nine percent of the JP's were unsure of the
percentage that could be taken, most of them having had no cases of this
kind.
It did not often prove necessary to seek a writ of execution in the cases
sampled."1 The records indicated resort to the courts' judgment execution
process in only 7 percent of the civil cases. And in only 1 percent of the cases
was an execution sale actually held.
6. Appeals
An appeal to superior court can be taken in any civil case where the judg-
ment or the amount in controversy exceeds 20 dollars." The requirement of
an appeal bond and the cost of prosecuting an appeal may discourage friv-
olous appeals." In any event, appeals are rare, occurring in just over 1 per-
cent of the cases. Perhaps they will become more frequent now that the
justices of the peace have jurisdiction of cases with much higher amounts
in controversy. The JP's records do not ordinarily indicate the outcome of
appeals in superior court. No appeal beyond superior court may be taken in
any case commenced in a justice of the peace court."
IV. CIMrNAL CASES
A. The Nature of the Criminal Cases
1. jurisdiction and Sublect Matter
Arizona's justices of the peace have criminal jurisdiction over misdemeanors
punishable by a fine not exceeding three hundred dollars or imprisonment in
the county jail for up to six months or both." The governing statutes also
specifically confer jurisdiction over a series of specific crimes already covered
by the general definition: petty theft," misdemeanor assaults,"' breaches of
the peace,"' and willful injury to property." The JP's also have jurisdiction
over felony preliminary hearings. Territorial jurisdiction ordinarily is limited
to crimes committed within the precinct. City magistrates have concurrent
criminal jurisdiction with the JP's for crimes committed within their city limits
and for ordinance violations." The only instance in which there is not juris-
81. See Amuz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-244 to -246 (1956).
82. Id. § 22-261(A).
83. Id. § 22-262 (Supp. 1972-73); id. § 22-282 (1956); id. § 22-283 (Supp. 1972-73).
84. Id. § 22-266 (A) (1956).
85. Id. § 22-301 (Supp. 1972-73).
86. See Id. §§ 13-663,-671.
87. See id. §§ 13-243,-244 (1956).
88. See id. § 13-371.
89. See id. § 13-501.
90. Id. § 22-402(B) (1956); id. § 28-1055 (Supp. 1972-73); see id. § 9-240(28).
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diction in both the justice of the peace court and the police court for offenses
that are within their subject matter jurisdiction and are committed within
the city limits, occurs when a municipality provides that its police court has
exclusive jurisdiction of city ordinance violations. 1
The inferior courts' criminal cases will be categorized for purposes of this
discussion as traffic cases, other criminal misdemeanors, and ordinance vio-
lations." Traffic cases made up a high percentage (78 percent) of all cases
handled by Arizona's inferior courts."3 Other criminal misdemeanors com-
prised 11 percent; civil cases, 5 percent; felony preliminary hearings, 3 per-
cent; and ordinance violations, 3 percent.
Most traffic cases involved speeding (33 percent) or other moving viola-
tions (26 percent). The more serious infractions of driving while intoxicated
(8 percent) and reckless driving (2 percent) were rarer. Most of the remain-
ing traffic prosecutions were for technical offenses, such as license, registra-
tion, and weight violations (24 percent). These various types of cases occurred
in similar proportions in urban and rural courts, except that rural courts
had 9 percent more speeding cases and correspondingly fewer of the other
moving and technical violations.
Other criminal misdemeanors included one dominant category of cases:
34 percent of them were for public drunkenness"" or other liquor offenses.
The next most frequent categories were assaults and breaches of the peace (13
percent), vagrancy (8 percent), game and fish violations (7 percent), theft
(7 percent), and paternity cases (4 percent). Miscellaneous and unidenti-
fied cases made up the remainder. The incidence of liquor cases was higher
in the urban courts than in the rural ones (42 percent to 31 percent). The
same was true of thefts (9 percent to 6 percent). Assaults and breaches of
the peace were more predominant in rural areas (16 percent to 8 percent),
as were vagrancy (10 percent to 3 percent) and game and fish violations (8
percent to 3 percent).
Ordinance violations were predominantly (59 percent) liquor offenses.
Other recurring kinds of ordinance cases were breaches of the peace (10
percent), zoning and housing violations (4 percent), occupational licensing
cases (4 percent), and theft (2 percent). As might be expected, almost all
ordinance prosecutions (90 percent) were in police courts. Liquor offenses
accounted for 41 percent of all state misdemeanor cases and all city ordinance
91. See p. 10 supra. An example of such exclusive jurisdiction is to be found in
PHOENIX, ARIZ., CODE pt. I, ch. 8, § 2 (1954).
92. Felony preliminary hearings will be treated separately at pp. 35-37 infra.
93. Over half the traffic cases for May, 1971, came from the Phoenix city magistrate
courts alone-23,066.
94. See ArZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-379 (Supp. 1972-73). This section also includes
narcotic intoxication. See id. §§ 36-2021 to -2031 (Supp. 1972) for new, noncriminal
procedures for handling alcoholics, to become effective January 1, 1974.
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cases added together. No other category of misdemeanor and ordinance cases
combined approached this one in frequency."
2. Securing the Defendant's Presence
Initial complainants in the inferior courts' criminal cases" are usually law
enforcement officers. In traffic cases, fewer than 1 percent of all cases are
commenced by private citizens. This figure jumps to 25 percent in other
misdemeanor cases, however, quite possibly due to family squabbles, which
reportedly are dealt with frequently. For ordinance cases, the percentage of
private complaints drops off again to 6 percent.
In Arizona misdemeanor cases, law enforcement officers made an initial
arrest rather than an initial complaint 54 percent of the time. In one out of
every six of these cases, the officer released the suspect upon his promise to
appear." Whenever the complaint is filed without the presence of an arrested
suspect, the judge must decide whether to secure his presence through the
use of a summons or an arrest warrant; he may issue a warrant only when he
has reasonable grounds to believe the person will not appear in response to a
summons." When the case began with a complaint, the judges issued war-
rants 58 percent of the time. There was a striking difference of practice on
this point between the urban and the rural courts. Although the percentage
of initial arrests was slightly higher in the urban courts (55 percent to 53
percent), the urban courts in cases of initial complaint usually issued a sum-
mons (68 percent); the rural courts usually issued an arrest warrant (73
percent). In ordinance cases statewide, arrest occurred initially 72 percent
of the time, followed by release upon promise to appear in just over one of
every 10 cases. In ordinance cases initiated by complaint, however, arrest
warrants were issued by the judge only 14 percent of the time.
There is a special procedure for traffic cases. When an officer arrests a
person for most misdemeanor traffic offenses, he releases the offender upon
the signing of a promise to appear-unless it reasonably appears to the officer
that the person is about to leave the state." Eighty-five percent of the state's
traffic cases sampled involved an initial promise to appear, with no significant
variation between urban and rural courts. Almost all of the remaining cases
involved an arrest followed by an appearance before the judge, not an initial
complaint in the absence of the defendant.
Virtually all criminal defendants encountered in the sample were indi-
viduals. The figure ran over 99 percent in traffic cases, and over 97 percent in
95. The next most frequent category was for assaults and breaches of the peace-just over
12 percent of the total of all misdemeanors and ordinance violations.
96. See Aruz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-311(A), -421(A) (1956); Amuz. R. Cum. P. IA.
97. Amuz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1403(4), -1422 (Supp. 1972-73).
98. Id. §§ 22-311(B),-421(B) (1956); ARrz. R. CRiM. P. 11A.
99. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1053(5) (Supp. 1972-73).
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both misdemeanor and ordinance cases. In the latter categories, there was
a scattering of corporate or other business defendants. Most defendants were
residents of the vicinity where the crime occurred. This was least true in
traffic cases, where 35 percent of the defendants lived in the city or justice
precinct and another 21 percent lived in the county. Twenty-eight percent
were not residents of Arizona. In misdemeanor cases, 66 percent of the de-
fendants lived in the city or precinct; 13 percent in the county; 17 percent out
of state. Ordinance cases, as might be expected, were even more localized.
Seventy-four percent of ordinance case defendants lived in the city; 11 percent
lived out of state. In all categories, the urban courts had significantly higher
percentages of local defendants than did the rural courts.'* In rural traffic
cases, for instance, out-of-state drivers made up 36 percent of the defendants.
3. Counsel
Most criminal trials in Arizona's inferior courts (excluding felony prelim-
inary hearings) do not involve the presence of counsel for either side. Only
8 percent of the traffic cases involved any lawyers. There was little variation
in this regard between urban and rural courts. And in 69 percent of the traffic
cases where a lawyer was present, he appeared for the prosecution. In most
of the remaining traffic cases where a lawyer was present, both parties had
lawyers; in only 7 percent of these was the defense alone represented by a
lawyer. Nine percent of all misdemeanor cases involved a prosecution lawyer
only; 1 percent, a defense lawyer only; 4 percent, representation for both sides.
Thus, in only 14 percent of these cases was a lawyer present in court. This
figure jumps to 22 percent in the urban courts, and falls off to 11 percent
in the rural courts. In ordinance cases, lawyers were predictably rare: prose-
cution only, 3 percent; defense only, 0.3 percent; both sides, 3 percent. The
total representation average for ordinance cases was under 7 percent: 9 per-
cent in the urban courts, 3 percent in the rural courts.
4. Jury Trial
Juries for criminal trials in Arizona inferior courts ordinarily consist of six
persons, all of whom must concur to render a verdict."' 1 With the consent of
the court, however, the parties may agree upon a lesser number of jurors."'
In justice of the peace court, a jury may be called in any criminal case upon
100. Recordkeeping concerning the defendant's residence was very incomplete. The re-
searchers were unable to discern the defendant's residence in over half the cases in
all categories. These percentages are for those cases in which residence appeared.
101. Am. CoNsT. art. II, § 23; ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 21-102(D) (Supp. 1972-73).
102. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 21-102(E) (Supp. 1972-73). The portion of this section
providing that the parties in criminal cases may agree on the concurrence of less
than all jurors to render a verdict may contravene the mandatory terminology of
AIuz. CONST. art. II, § 23.
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the demand of either party. ' In police court, there is no right to a jury
trial for violations of ordinances unless they involve the kinds of offenses that
were tried by juries at common law."' In the remaining ordinance cases, and
in all prosecutions in police court for violation of state law, a jury may be
had upon the demand of either party."'1 Jury demands were very rare in the
criminal cases studied. There were juries in just under 2 percent of the traffic
cases filed. In misdemeanor cases, juries were called only 0.3 percent of the
time. In ordinance cases, jury trials comprised just over 2 percent of the cases.
When a jury demand is made, the inferior court judge orders the sheriff,
the constable, or a policeman to summon the requisite number of qualified
jurors.' Probably because of the rarity of criminal juries, selection procedures
discovered by the field study tended to be informal, especially in the JP
courts.' Thus, only 37 percent of the JP's said that they select jurors in a
random manner from the list of registered voters, compared with 55 percent
of the city magistrates. Twenty-one percent of the JP's and 18 percent of the
magistrates relied on a list kept by the sheriff, constable, or chief of police.
A full 18 percent of the JP's, but only 2 percent of the magistrates, simply
tried to find available people. Eleven percent of the state's inferior court
judges either had never had a jury case or had encountered them too rarely
to have established a procedure for selecting jurors.
Arizona's justices of the peace and city magistrates probably have the power
to instruct juries on the law in criminal cases, 08 although they are forbidden
to comment on the evidence.1 The judges' varying opinions concerning their
power to instruct criminal juries on the law are demonstrated by the vary-
ing practices they follow. Over one-half of the city magistrates (57 percent),
and a significant proportion of the JP's (29 percent), said that they always
instruct criminal juries on the law. Conversely, 16 percent of the magistrates
and 26 percent of the JP's said that they never do so. Others indicated that
they sometimes instruct the juries, or that they simply read the statute to
them. Twenty-one percent of the JP's and 13 percent of the magistrates did
not respond definitely to this question, many of them mentioning the rarity
of or absence of experience with jury trials.
103. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22--320(A) (1956).
104. id. § 22-425(A).
105. Asuz. CoNsT. art. II, § 24; Amuz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-320(B), -425(A) (1956);
Rothweiler v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 37, 410 P.2d 479 (1966).
106. AoUz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-320(B) (1956).
107. The rules of procedure in the superior court apply to the inferior courts insofar as
applicable. Id. § 22-313 (JP courts); id. § 22-423 (police courts). Although the
officer summoning the jury in the inferior courts must do so by oral notification, he
is not instructed how to select the jurors. Id. § 22-332. Municipalities may use the
jury formation procedure used in superior court. Id. § 22-426 (Supp. 1972-73).
108. See Crouch v. Justice of the Peace Court, 7 Ariz. App. 460, 464--65, 440 P.2d 1000,
1004--05 (1968).
109. Auz. CONST. art. VI, § 27; Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-323(B) (1956).
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5. Disposition of the Cases
Most criminal cases in Arizona inferior courts result in victories for the
prosecution. Our study found that the frequency of conviction was lowest
in traffic cases-49 percent. To this figure must be added, however, some
significant portion of the traffic cases in which the defendant did not appear
at trial (29 percent); in many of these cases, the defendant forfeited bail
as a substitute for a traffic fine rather than as an attempt to avoid prosecu-
tion. In an additional 10 percent of the traffic cases, charges were dismissed
by the court without trial. The defendant succeeded in gaining an acquittal
at trial only 0.6 percent of the time. (It should be remembered that this
acquittal rate, like those reported in the succeeding paragraphs, is a per-
centage of all cases filed, not merely cases disputed at trial; in the latter
situation the acquittal rate is higher."') The remaining 10 percent of the cases
were mostly still technically pending, perhaps indicating more clearly success-
ful attempts by defendants to avoid prosecution. A few cases ended in
suspended proceedings, changes of venue, and other dispositions. The figures
were similar when urban and rural courts were compared, but the urban
courts did have relatively more nonappearances and acquittals, and relatively
fewer formal convictions, than did the rural courts.
Statewide, 62 percent of the misdemeanor cases resulted in convictions.
Fourteen percent were dismissed by the prosecution or the judge before trial,
and defendants failed to appear for trial 7 percent of the time. An additional
9 percent of misdemeanor cases are still pending. Only 0.6 percent of all
misdemeanor cases filed resulted in acquittals at trial. The remaining cases
included suspended proceedings, changes of venue, and other dispositions.
The urban courts had relatively fewer cases still pending, more pretrial dis-
missals, fewer nonappearances, and slightly fewer convictions than did the
rural courts.
The ordinance cases had the highest conviction rate-75 percent. Only 2
percent of these cases were still pending. Nine percent were dismissed prior
to trial by the court or the prosecutor. Defendants failed to appear i1 percent
of the time and won acquittals 0.3 percent of the time. There was little varia-
tion in the results between urban and rural courts. The results in these
criminal cases are usually final because appeals of inferior court verdicts run
below 3 percent in all criminal categories."'
The "typical" criminal case in Arizona's inferior courts, then, is a prosecu-
tion for a traffic moving violation or for drunkenness. It is commenced by
110. The Chief Presiding Judge of the Phoenix City Court has estimated the acquittal rate
in contested traffic cases at about 25 to 30 percent. Letter from Eugene K. Mangum,
Chief Presiding Judge of the Phoenix City Court, to Edward W. Cleary, Professor of
Law, Arizona State University, January 2, 1973, on file at Law and the Social Order.
111. See p. 34 infra.
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an arrest of an individual defendant who lives in the vicinity, followed by
a nonappearance at trial and the forfeiture of bail, a successful attempt to
have charges dismissed before trial, or an appearance by the defendant at
a trial without jury, with no lawyers present, at which the chances for con-
viction are very strong. The average elapsed time from initial arrest or com-
plaint to trial was not long in any category of cases sampled, and it was
always significantly longer in urban courts than rural ones. In traffic cases,
the average was 35 days (49 days in urban courts; 15 days in rural). In mis-
demeanor cases, the average was 14 days (18 days in urban courts; 10 days
in rural). And in ordinance cases, the average elapsed time was a speedy
seven days (10 days in urban courts; three days in rural). These figures
suggest that delay, so much a problem at other levels of court administration,
is not a problem at the inferior court level. It should be remembered, how-
ever, that many of these courts have very heavy caseloads, with the result
that there is little time to devote to each case. The defendants' impression
of haste and "assembly line" justice, so often criticized in our lower courts,"'
can thus be present despite the absence of long delay from complaint to trial.
B. Bail and Sentence Practices
1. Bail
In Arizona, accused persons have the right to bail for all offenses except
capital crimes and felonies committed while on bail for a felony." 3 The
bail rules governing the superior courts are applicable to the inferior courts."4
For traffic offenses, the inferior court judges are required to prepare a sched-
ule with a specific bail amount for each offense and to designate a deputy
other than a law enforcement officer to collect bail when the court is closed."'
In Arizona criminal misdemeanor cases sampled, the average elapsed time
from arrest to appearance before the judge for the setting of bail was just
over two days. The average elapsed time from arrest to release on bond was
ten and one-half days. The delay until appearance was greater in the rural
courts (2.5 days compared with 1.8 days), but the delay until release on
bail was much greater in the urban courts (14.4 days compared with 3.3
days). The time from arrest to appearance was about the same for ordinance
violations (two days), with no significant variations between urban and rural
courts. The time from arrest to release was significantly shortened in these
112. See, e.g., THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FnF-E SociETY 128 (1967) [here-
inafter cited as CRIME Comm'N REPORT].
113. Amuz. CONST. art. II, § 22; Anz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1577, -1578 (Supp. 1972-
73). But see Aiuz. R. CrtM. P. 41.
114. Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-313 (1956) (JP court); id. § 22-423 (police court).
See id. § 22-314.
115. Id. § 22-112 (Supp. 1972-73) (JP court); id. § 22-424(B) (police court).
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cases, however, averaging 3.76 days, again with little variation between urban
and rural courts. The longest time between arrest and appearance (4.6 days)
occurred in traffic cases. These were probably the most serious traffic cases,
often involving injury to the defendant; most traffic offenders were released
immediately upon signing a notice to appear, and they were not included
In this group.
The majority of traffic cases (74 percent) did not result in the setting of
monetary bail.' Where monetary bail was required, the bail was $20 or less
in 62 percent of the cases. It was between $21 and $50 in 28 percent of the
cases. Bail amounts in excess of $50 were scattered about evenly along a con-
tinuum up to $300 and then fell off in frequency, with no bail set in excess of
$1,000 in the traffic cases sampled. Similarly, most criminal misdemeanors
(82 percent) did not involve the setting of monetary bail.P' In cases where
monetary bail was required, bail was $50 or less 48 percent of the time and
$150 or less 71 percent of the time. A few criminal misdemeanor cases in-
volved bail of over $1,000. In ordinance cases, no money bail was set in 87
percent of the cases. When it was set, it was less than $75 about 82 percent
of the time.
2. Fines
Statutes authorize Arizona inferior courts to impose fines of up to $300. "s
Fines were formally imposed in almost half the traffic cases, and bail for-
feitures produced the equivalent of a fine in many additional cases." ' In 72
percent of the traffic cases in which a fine was imposed, it was $20 or less;
in another 12 percent of these cases it was $50 or less. The higher fine amounts
were distributed about evenly up to the $300 maximum. In 5 percent of the
traffic cases, the defendant received a jail sentence rather than a fine. In
misdemeanor cases, fines were imposed 33 percent of the time and jail terms
29 percent of the time, accounting together for the 62 percent of the cases
producing convictions. Sixty-eight percent of the misdemeanor fines were
$50 or less. In ordinance cases, fines were imposed in 40 percent of the cases
and jail terms in 35 percent, for the total of 75 percent convictions. Eighty-
eight percent of the fines were $50 or less. There was no significant variation
in the figures for any category of criminal cases when urban and rural courts
were compared.
116. This includes both cases in which trial was had on the spot at the defendant's first
appearance following arrest and those in which the defendant was released on his
own recognizance for later trial. These categories were not separated in the data.
The hail figures also include many instances in which bail was posted and simply
forfeited as the equivalent of a fine. See Aruz. R. TRAFFIC CASES P. VII(b).
117. This includes cases in which a summons rather than an arrest was used, those in
which trial was had upon defendant's first appearance, and those in which release
was granted on recognizance. These categories were not separated in the data.
118. See p. 23 supra.
119. See p. 23 supra.
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Arizona statutes providing that a person may be imprisoned to satisfy a
fine'" have been limited by the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Tate v. Short."' In Tate the Court held that a person may not be jailed
solely because he is too poor to pay a fine. Thus, the Arizona statutes can
now apply only to refusal to pay a fine, not inability to do so. Both the
Arizona Supreme Court, pursuant to its rulemaking power over the state's
courts,"' and the legislature, through new statutes,'" have now expressly
sanctioned the delayed or installment payment of fines when the defendant
cannot immediately pay them. In so doing, they seem mainly to have codified
a practice already existing in most Arizona inferior courts. The field research-
ers asked the judges what arrangements they were making with offenders
for the payment of fines. Virtually all the city magistrates (43 of 44) said
that they were either accepting installments or giving varying periods of time
in which to pay, in some cases as long as 90 days. Most of the justices of
the peace (61 of 76) said they were doing the same. Six JP's, however,
answered that the person had to pay immediately or be jailed. Two JP's
answered that they were giving straight jail sentences to avoid the prob-
lem, and three JP's answered that they jail only nonlocal people who cannot
pay. Four JP's did not respond to the question. The survey was made two
months after the issuance of the Arizona Supreme Court rule ordering judges
to provide for installment payments and just at the time that the similar
statutory provisions were becoming effective-but well over a year after Tate.
3. Jail Terms
Jail sentences were rare in Arizona traffic cases sampled during the study.
Sentences were awarded in 7 percent of the traffic cases, but most (65 per-
cent) were suspended, resulting in probationary status. Eighty-two percent
of the sentences were for 30 days or less. In misdemeanor cases, jail sentences
were more frequent (29 percent), but suspension still occurred in most cases
(52 percent). Seventy-one percent of the jail terms in misdemeanor cases
were for 30 days or less; 87 percent were for 60 days or less. Jail sentences
were imposed most frequently (32 percent) in ordinance cases, and sus-
pensions were least frequent (23 percent). Still, 84 percent of the sentences
were for 30 days or less. Sentencing patterns did not differ greatly between
the urban and the rural courts in these categories.
Tate v. Short," holding unconstitutional the practice of jailing persons for
inability to pay fines, was decided three months prior to the test month of
120. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1648, 22-352(B) (1956). See id. § 22-354(A).
121. 401 U.S. 395 (1971). See also In re Collins, 108 Ariz. 310, 497 P.2d 523 (1972).
122. See In re Collins, 108 Ariz. 310, 497 P.2d 523 (1972).
123. Am. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1659, -1661 (Supp. 1972-73).
124. 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
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May, 1971. Nevertheless, in addition to the jail sentences summarized in the
preceding paragraphs, Arizona inferior courts were still meting out some
"dollars or days" sentences. These sentences, of course, are unconstitutional
only when jailing punishes inability rather than refusal to pay,' a difference
ordinarily not revealed in court dockets. The most frequent use of "dollars
or days" sentences was found in ordinance cases. This kind of sentence was
imposed and discharged by payment in 7 percent of these cases, and resulted
in jail for nonpayment in another 15 percent. In misdemeanor cases, the
respective figures were 6 percent and 5 percent; in traffic cases, 4 percent
and 0.4 percent.
In almost one-half the cases in which a person was jailed for nonpayment
of a fine, the researchers found evidence that the defendant had been given
an opportunity to pay according to his means. In the other cases, the oppor-
tunity may have been given but was not recorded. The elapsed time from
trial to jailing for nonpayment was measured on the theory that the longer
the time between these events, the clearer the opportunity to pay. (Such a
figure, of course, omits cases of refusal to pay stated at trial.) In traffic cases,
the average elapsed time from trial to jailing for nonpayment was less than a
day; in ordinance cases, just over a day. In misdemeanor cases, the average
was just over a week, largely because the average was just over two weeks
in urban courts. These figures tend to indicate that the Tate decision was not
yet being fully implemented in Arizona inferior courts when the study was
made.
Aside from the traditional fines and jail sentences, the inferior court judges
imposed some innovative kinds of sentences. About one-half the judges indi-
cated that they impose some or all of the following kinds of sentences: Atten-
dance at counseling programs for alcoholics or at defensive driving schools
for traffic offenders, restitution to the victim for goods stolen or damage
done, litter collection along the highways, or probation of some kind.
C. Administering the Criminal Cases
Arizona's inferior court judges have experienced some problems in admin-
istering their criminal caseload that are, not surprisingly, different from prob-
lems experienced at the superior court level. The justices of the peace and
city magistrates responded in similar fashion to most questions asked them
on this subject. The JP's questionnaire responses indicated that the JP's
generally prefer dealing with criminal rather than civil cases, perhaps be-
cause of greater familiarity with criminal procedure.
The threshold problem of scheduling cases differs in the inferior courts,
because of the widely varying caseloads. The Arizona Supreme Court en-
125. See note 121 supra and accompanying text.
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courages the inferior courts to schedule traffic trials at times separate from
other criminal trials,12 presumably to prevent mingling the two groups of
offenders in court. Most of the judges (61 percent), however, said they do
not schedule traffic cases separately. The most frequent reasons given were
that this procedure is inappropriate in rural areas, or that it is otherwise
unnecessary-perhaps because of a high preponderance of traffic cases in a
given court or a practice of simply trying cases immediately as they come
up. The judges were also asked whether they schedule evening court sessions.
Sixty-six percent reported that they do not, usually adding that evening
sessions are unnecessary. Twenty-five percent of the judges both held such
sessions and found them worthwhile; the practices and responses of the re-
maining judges varied.
Many of the judges have to deal with seasonal variations in their caseload,
especially in traffic cases. Seventeen percent found the traffic caseload
"somewhat" or "much" higher in summer; 12 percent estimated the increase
as double the number of cases, or more. In contrast, 13 percent reported a
somewhat higher traffic caseload in winter. One-half the judges said they
perceive no seasonal traffic variation. The variation for other types of crim-
inal cases does not seem as great. Fifty-nine percent of the judges reported
no detectable seasonal variation in misdemeanor and ordinance cases.
Eighteen percent said they had more of such criminal cases in the spring
and summer, and 13 percent said they had more in the fall and winter. None
indicated variations approaching those in traffic cases in some courts.
The availability of prosecutors is sometimes a problem in the inferior
courts, especially in rural areas. One-half the judges reported that prosecutors
were available on a regular basis, and another 22 percent reported that prose-
cutors were "always" or "usually" available. In contrast, 20 percent said that
prosecutors were available "sometimes" or "seldom enough to be a problem."
In rare instances, it was reported that prosecutors could almost never be
obtained.
The judges were asked whether they could obtain traffic offenders' prior
records quickly enough to utilize them. Over one-half (53 percent) said that
they could; 7 percent, that they sometimes could; 9 percent, that they could
not. Many of the remaining judges (11 percent) said they rely on the arrest-
ing law enforcement officer or prosecutor to provide records of prior con-
victions in traffic cases. Some judges (8 percent) said that prior traffic
records are available only for local offenses. Conviction records in other
criminal cases seem to be less frequently available. Only 34 percent of the
judges said that these records can be obtained quickly enough to be useful;
6 percent, that they sometimes can; 15 percent, that they cannot. Again, it
126. ARuz. R. TRAFFIC CASES P. IX.
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was frequently reported (14 percent), especially by city magistrates, that only
records of local offenses are available. And many judges (23 percent), espe-
cially the JP's, said they rely on the prosecutor or arresting officer to furnish
records of prior convictions.
Prior discussion in connection with the civil cases suggested that the exis-
tence of the contempt powers of Arizona inferior court judges is a difficult
and doubtful question. " Interestingly, the judges seem more confident of
the existence of such powers in criminal cases than they are in civil cases.
Almost one-half of them (48 percent) felt they definitely had the contempt
power in criminal cases; 22 percent were doubtful; 23 percent thought the
power absent. The remainder did not respond definitely, probably indicating
doubt on their part.
D. Criminal Appeals
The defendant in an Arizona inferior court criminal case may appeal any
conviction to the superior court,'" but usually no higher."' The appeals are
retried de novo."' This procedure has the effect, of course, of causing some
repetition within the judicial system. Appeals from inferior court convictions
were rare for all categories of cases sampled. Traffic appeals were the most
frequent, 2.7 percent statewide. For misdemeanors, the figure was 1.4 percent;
for ordinance violations, 1.3 percent.
A recent study of the Arizona Superior Court's criminal cases, conducted
by the Behavior Research Center of Phoenix, revealed the distribution and
outcome of criminal appeals from the inferior courts in 1970.131 Surprisingly,
88 percent of the appeals came from Maricopa County (compared with 6
percent from Pima County).13' This concentration of appeals in Phoenix has
no obvious explanation. Statewide, 51 percent of the appeals resulted in a
second conviction. These second convictions were made up of plea bargained
cases (13 percent), other guilty pleas at trial (3 percent), and reconvictions
after a contested trial (35 percent).'" The 49 percent of cases not reaching
a second judgment of conviction were divided into cases dismissed before
trial (23 percent) and acquittals (26 percent).'" In Maricopa County, 53
127. See p. 18 supra.
128. Axuz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 22-371(A) (Supp. 1972-73) (JP court); id. § 22-425(B)
(1956) (police court).
129. Id. §22-375(B) (1956).
130. Id. § 22-374(A) (Supp. 1972-73). Auz. CONST. art. VI, § 30 forbids justice of
the peace courts from becoming courts of record.
131. Behavior Research Center & Arizona Criminal Code and Rules Revision Project,
Survey of 1970 Arizona Superior Court Criminal Cases 66-74 (on file at Law and
the Social Order) [hereinafter cited as Survey].




percent of the appeals resulted in a second conviction, but in Pima County,
only 34 percent of the cases sampled did so."' Again, there is no clear explana-
tion for the difference. The appeals took an average of 110 days to reach
completion, statewide."' One reason for the rather low general rate of con-
viction on appeals may be a disinclination on the part of city prosecutors
to pursue them vigorously, since fines collected in superior court appeals are
paid to the county.3"
E. Coroner's Inquests
Each Arizona justice of the peace is the ex officio coroner for his precinct."'
His duty in this capacity is to initiate a formal investigation into the cause
of any death that he determines occurred in circumstances affording reason-
able ground to suspect foul play.'" The actual investigation is conducted by
a coroner's jury summoned by the judge.'" The jury must examine the body
and hear any witnesses, who ordinarily include a physician who has exam-
ined the body or conducted an autopsy."' The jury is then required to render
a verdict on the cause of death."' If the jury finds the death to have been
the result of criminal conduct, it must identify any known culprit, and the
judge must then initiate criminal proceedings against him."3
The justices of the peace spend relatively little of their time on coroner's
inquests. No judge interviewed for our study estimated that over 25 per-
cent of his time went to these duties; 87 percent of the judges estimated
that less than 10 percent of their time on the job was spent as a coroner.
Despite the minimal time demands imposed by coroner's duties, the judges
seem to find them both unpleasant and inappropriate. When asked what
features of the inferior court system needed improvement, 18 of the 76 judges
interviewed mentioned a need to remove the coroner's function-the second
most frequent response to this question. Some of the judges suggested that
a medical examiner who is a physician be used in place of the laymen coroners
and juries.'"
F. Felony Preliminary Hearings
Arizona inferior courts do not have the power to try felonies or high mis-
135. See d.
136. Id. at 70.
137. Auz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 13-1675 (Supp. 1972-73); see id. § 22-374.
138. Id. § 22--501 (1956).
139. Id. § 22-511 (1956); id. §§ 36-334, -335 (Supp. 1972).
140. Id. § 22-511 (1956).
141. Id. §§ 22-514, -515 (1956).
142. Id. § 22-517.
143. Id. §§ 22-517 to -519.
144. See id. § 33-335(D) (Supp. 1972).
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demeanors.'" The Arizona Constitution provides,"" however, that felony trials
must be preceded either by a preliminary examination before a magistrate
(the term includes both the JP's and the city magistrates 14 ) or by a grand
jury proceeding." In Arizona preliminary hearings, the defendant is entitled
to be represented by a lawyer if he can afford one (and in counties having
a public defender, even if he cannot),."" No Arizona case has yet held that
indigent defendants are always entitled to have lawyers appointed for them
at preliminary hearings.'" As might be expected, lawyers were present in
preliminary hearings sampled much more frequently than in other inferior
court proceedings. Statewide both sides had lawyers in 60 percent of the
hearings (80 percent in urban courts, 49 percent in rural courts). The prose-
cution alone was represented in another 11 percent of the cases; the defense
alone in 1 percent of the cases. In 11 percent of the cases, the records did
not reveal whether lawyers were present or not, suggesting that they were
not.
As a result of the preliminary hearings, 48 percent of the defendants were
bound over to superior court for trial (58 percent in urban courts, 43 percent
in rural ones). The charges were reduced to misdemeanors in return for
guilty pleas in 17 percent of the cases. The charges were dismissed in 20
percent of the cases and were still pending in 8 percent of them. Various
other dispositions accounted for the remainder. The amount of bail set was
$1,000 or more in 52 percent of the cases (61 percent, urban; 46 percent,
rural). Bail was never set at less than $150 in the cases sampled; however,
18 percent of the cases involved no monetary bail. In the cases reduced to
misdemeanors and disposed of by the magistrates, jail terms were awarded
rather more often than fines, but the sentences were suspended in about two-
thirds of the cases. Predictably, fines tended to be larger and jail terms longer
than in other inferior court criminal cases.
The average elapsed time from arrest to initial appearance before the
magistrate for the setting of bail in felony preliminary hearings was a day
and one-half. The elapsed time from arrest until release on bail averaged
just over four days. The recent study by the Behavior Research Center, dis-
145. Id. § 22-301 (Supp. 1972-73); id. § 22-402 (1956) see id. § 13-103 (Supp.
1972-73), giving courts and prosecutors discretion to classify some crimes for pur-
poses of having them decided by the inferior or superior courts.
146. ARrz. CONST. art. II, § 30. The high misdemeanors, however, may be commenced
in superior court by the filing of a prosecutor's information, without a preliminary
hearing. Mo Yaen v. State, 18 Ariz. 491, 492, 163 P. 135, 136 (1917).
147. Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1-215(11) (Supp 1972-73).
148. See id. § 21-401 to -416.
149. See id. § 11-584(1); Amuz. R. Citum. P. 16, 23.
150. See, e.g., State v. Sheffield, 104 Ariz. 278, 451 P.2d 607 (1969); State v. Chambers,
100 Ariz. 368, 414 P.2d 742 (1966). But see Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1
(1970).
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cussed in connection with criminal appeals,"' found the statewide average
elapsed time from the initial bail determination to the preliminary hearing
to be 21 days. It was only 18 days in Maricopa County and 25 days in Pima
County But in the sparsely populated Arizona counties having only one
superior court judge, an average of 55 days passed before the preliminary
hearing was held."' The problems of logistics involved in bringing lawyers
and witnesses together at an isolated inferior court are obvious.
V. CONCLUSION
A. An Evaluation of Arizona's Inferior Courts
The principal organizational characteristic of Arizona's inferior court sys-
tem is decentralization. The organizing and financing agencies for the in-
ferior courts are the separate counties and municipalities; the state imposes
only broad overall structural and fiscal controls. And within each county,
there are of course several separate inferior court systems-the justice of the
peace courts form one system, and there is another separate "system" for each
incorporated city having a police court, since budgeting and control operate
at the municipal level.
The overriding conclusion of this article is that the fragmented structure
of the inferior courts causes unnecessary inefficiencies and inequities. This
conclusion remains valid despite the fact that decentralization of some func-
tions is vital to the effective operation of these courts. Two major weaknesses
are evident: (1) The decentralization of finance causes unequal expenditure
in support of these courts and introduces considerations impairing overall
organizational efficiency; (2) the statutory distribution of power includes
rigidities that impair flexible local response to problems and delegates some
functions that could be better handled at the state level. The ensuing analysis
of the field study's findings will provide concrete examples to buttress these
generalizations.
The selection and qualification of inferior court judges currently follows
a bifurcated pattern that creates some anomalies. There seems no clear reason
why the justice of the peace should be an elective office, while most city
magistrates fill appointive posts. In practice, of course, the tendency for JP's
to have been appointed initially to fill a vacancy reduces the effect of a dif-
ference in selection procedure. One result of allowing the cities to choose
selection procedures and qualifications for the magistrates is that both for-
mal and actual qualifications of the city magistrates are often higher than
those of the JP's. Thus, only police courts ever have a requirement that the
judge be a lawyer. Also, the city magistrates interviewed were more fre-
151. See Survey, supra note 131.
152. See d. at 34.
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quently lawyers than were the JP's, and they generally had more formal
education. These findings do not represent a statewide tendency, however,
insofar as the disparity simply reflects the high concentration of lawyer city
magistrates in the urban police courts of Phoenix and Tucson."1 Such a con-
centration of lawyer judges in the urban areas is, of course, to be expected
in any Arizona inferior court system. But to say that lawyers are rare in rural
counties, which is assuredly true,'" does not fully justify the present situation
for two reasons. First, the existing disparity is largely between judges who
are lawyers in the urban areas and judges with only a high school education
in rural areas. If rural judges cannot always be lawyers, they need not so
often be only high school graduates. Second, the existing functions of the
inferior court judges can be separated into those that require lawyers to
discharge them and those that do not. For example, in rural areas a resident
magistrate who is not a lawyer might be authorized to handle search war-
rants, bail determinations, and minor infractions such as speeding cases, but
not civil cases above a given figure, felony preliminary hearings, or impor-
tant criminal misdemeanors such as drunken driving. These cases could be
handled by lawyers or specially trained magistrates riding circuit from the
county seat.'"
The present lack of formal training for Arizona inferior court judges is
understandable in light of the limited capacities of the counties and cities to
provide it. This function is better performed at the state level, as the limited
efforts initiated by the office of the Administrative Director of the Courts
demonstate. Indications that the judges keep reasonably well abreast of rele-
vant developments in the law are probably due to the efforts of the Admin-
istrative Director's office. But many of the judges still must depend upon the
county or city attorneys for everyday legal advice. Since these are the prose-
cutors regularly appearing before the judges, personally or through their
staffs, a serious and unnecessary conflict of interest exists, ' which could be
remedied by providing for a regular source of advice in the state system.
The fragmented financial structure of the inferior courts constitutes per-
haps the most serious deficiency in their management. The budgetary figures
show that statewide county revenues approximate expenditures for the JP
153. See note 24 and pp. 6-7 supra.
154. State Bar of Arizona figures for December 31, 1972, identified seven of Arizona's
14 counties as having fewer than 25 active lawyers: Mohave (22), Navajo (18),
Apache (15), Gila (12), Santa Cruz (11), Graham (9), and Greenlee (2).
155. In the wake of Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), the necessity for the
presence of defense counsel before a jail sentence may be imposed will prevent
immediate trial of major criminal cases anyway.
156. Cf. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972), for federal due process
considerations; analogy may be taken to the administrative law doctrine of separation
of functions between judge and prosecution, see generally K. DAvis, Ar nmsr Nsu'TVE
LAw TExT § 13.01 to 13.04 (3d ed. 1972).
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courts. Some counties, however, spend substantially more to maintain these
courts than they take in; others, substantially less. These relative expenditures
reveal policy differences among the counties concerning the level of support
appropriate for the JP courts, or at least differences in the relative fiscal
positions of the counties. Similarly, absolute differences between the counties
in amounts spent to maintain the courts may not stem entirely from varia-
tions in population and caseload. These differences, whether caused by policy
or necessity, are not justifiable if Arizona desires an even statewide quality
of justice.
The high degree of profitability of most police courts stands in sharp con-
trast to the more balanced figures for the JP courts. It may be a denial of
due process for cities heavily dependent on revenues from their police courts
to allow municipally paid magistrates to decide the cases and levy the fines.
In the recent case of Ward v. City of Monroeville,"' the United States Supreme
Court held that it was a violation of due process for an Ohio mayor, who
had extensive responsibilities for village finances, to sit as a judge in cases
upon which the village greatly depended for revenue. The Court, however,
distinguished and apparently approved Dugan v. Ohio,"8 which held that a
mayor without any close relationship to city finances could sit as a municipal
judge. Read together, these cases apparently approve the present Arizona
scheme for police courts, especially since the contention was made and re-
jected in Dugan that paying the judge's salary out of municipal revenues
derived in part from fines would fatally affect his impartiality in any given
case. But even if Arizona's police court scheme does not offend minimal con-
stitutional guarantees, its high profitability is bound to create public sus-
picion that it dispenses "cash-register justice."" Since it is vitally important
that the courts be above the appearance of corruption, as well as above the
fact of it, the cities should be relieved of financial responsibility for the
police courts.
The discussion of variations in expenditures for Arizona's inferior courts
has assumed that court budgeting does affect the quality of justice dispensed.
The premise seems sound at least insofar as higher salaries for judges will
attract better qualified aspirants for the position. -In addition, the level of
expenditure affects the quality of justice in at least one other fashion: the
quality of the physical facilities used as courtrooms. It seems likely that
the quality of judicial proceedings is affected by major differences in the
dignity of the surroundings. And in any event, undignified "courtrooms" used
for some Arizona inferior courts surely demean the entire Arizona judicial
157. 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
158. 277 U.S. 61 (1928).
159. See, e.g., CRIME COMIMN REPORT, supra note 112, at 129--30; The Phoenix Gazette,
Sept. 29, 1972, at 27, col. 1.
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system in the eyes of persons exposed to them. It seems unlikely that the
public will carefully differentiate among the levels of the judicial system,
thoughtfully identifying what governmental unit maintains the particular court.
Partly for reasons of finance, the organizational structure of the inferior
courts hampers efficiency. The cities' dependency on revenues f:rom their
police courts suggests a reason for their continued existence that is unrelated
to whether they are really necessary. If the statutory allocation of fines were
reversed-to the unit of government whose law is broken rather than to
the unit of government maintaining the court-perhaps more cities would
eliminate their separate police courts, transferring their business to the JP
whose precinct includes the city. Another statutory provision with unfor-
tunate rigidities is the prescription of salary ranges for the JP's on the basis
of population rather than caseload; this arrangement causes unfairness when-
ever a judge with a heavier caseload than his colleagues receives less pay.
In general, a system of courts with overlapping territorial and subject
matter jurisdiction but without centralized management does not seem cal-
culated to produce optimum efficiency. The inferior court judges work widely
varying hours to cope with widely varying caseloads. Sometimes, in areas
where a JP court and a police court coexist, neither court is a busy one.
Separate and often inadequate recordkeeping in the various courts makes
it difficult even to discern where the present divisions of authority are ineffi-
cient. Centralized recordkeeping and management could result in better iden-
tification of manpower needs and facilitate a more flexible response to them.
For instance, the seasonal caseload variations existing in some areas could
be met by transferring personnel in anticipation of need. The present super-
visory activity of the Administrative Director of the Courts, which includes
limited transfers of judges to meet needs caused by illness or burdensome
caseloads, is a hopeful beginning in this direction, but it is only a beginning.
Certain major characteristics of civil cases in Arizona's JP courts appeared
frequently enough in the field study's data to justify generalizing about these
cases as a group. Suits to collect amounts due on contracts were by far the
most frequent. Business plaintiffs, often represented by lawyers, ordinarily
opposed individual defendants, infrequently represented by lawyers. Most
cases involved no lawyers, and no contested trial. Instead, defaults (25 per-
cent) and presumably settled pending cases (31 percent) made up the bulk
of the dispositions- only about 18 percent of the cases filed resulted in a
trial. Both jury trials and appeals were rare.
The picture that emerges is that of a judicial system which a creditor in-
vokes to force payment or settlement of his claim, the merits of which are
not ordinarily litigated. Insofar as these claims are acknowledged by both
parties to be valid, there is of course no societal value in formalistic litigation
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of them. The danger remains, however, that the inherent coercive power of
judicial process will cause uninformed or timid defendants having a defense
against part or all of the amount claimed to forego assertion of their rights."'
To the extent that the availability of formal process papers from the inferior
courts creates a danger of unjust settlements, these courts should assume
a concomitant responsibility to do what is reasonably feasible to make defen-
dants aware of their rights and unafraid to exercise them. Possibilities range
from including information regarding legal aid organizations with the sum-
mons and complaint to providing a staff of paralegal personnel,' trained in
inferior court procedures, to help plaintiffs and defendants litigate their con-
troversies.
If the purpose of small claims courts is to provide inexpensive and fair
settlement of minor controversies,' 2 hopefully without the necessity of pri-
vate legal counsel, the court's willingness to help the lay litigant deal with
unfamiliar procedures becomes crucial to the success of the system. At present,
Arizona JP's exhibit a variety of attitudes regarding assistance to civil liti-
gants seeking information about how to pursue a claim or defense. There
seems to be no justification for policy variations on this important matter.
A centrally managed inferior court system could give more consideration to
the problem than has been given to date, establish and promulgate a standard
policy in search of maximum feasible aid to the litigant, and implement the
policy by providing staff help, forms, and information to the various courts.
Most Arizona JP courts have no standard procedure for reviewing and dis-
posing of old pending cases. This failure makes it difficult to measure the
actual workload of the courts. Furthermore, a procedure for reviewing open
cases can provide an opportunity for examining the fairness of out-of-court
settlements, perhaps by adopting much the same procedure as is now speci-
fied for questioning the plaintiff on the validity and amount of an unliquidated
claim before awarding him a default judgment.11 3 A statute could condition
160. An argument could be made that, insofar as the state's process has the effect of
coercing pretrial settlements from defendants who are afraid to present their defenses
in a court of law or are unaware of them, the state causes a taking of property without
due process. Cf. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Note, The Persecution and
Intimidation of the Low-income Litigant as Performed by the Small Claim's Court in
California, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1657 (1969). Such a conclusion would rest on the
premise that the state incurs an affirmative obligation to supervise out-of-court
settlements for at least minimal fairness when its process has the known effect of
intimidating some persons from asserting rights to defense, even if those rights are
formally stated in the process papers. Any such conclusion seems well beyond existing
case law.
161. See, e.g., Statsky, Paraprofessionals: Expanding the Legal Service Delivery Team,
27 J. LEGAL ED. 397 (1972); Note, supra note 160, at 1682-84.
162. See, e.g., Am. Jun. Soc'y, REP. No. 23, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE COURTS OF LiMrrED
JURIsDIcTION (1968) [hereinafter cited as REPORT 23]; Fox, Small Claims Revisions-
A Break for the Layman, 20 DiE PAUL L. REv. 912 (1971). Comment, The California
Small Claims Court, 52 CALIF. L. REv. 876 (1964).
163. See p. 18 supra.
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the plaintiffs access to the court's process upon agreement to notify the
court of any settlement and to appear to have it ratified.
The study data indicated differing attitudes and practices regarding en-
couragement of settlements and inquiry into claims before awarding default
judgments. In both matters, the inferior court judges could provide an im-
portant check on unfair resolutions of controversies initially committed to
them. The practice followed by some JP's of inquiring extensively into any
claim for which default judgment is sought, including questioning designed
to discover whether there are defenses known to the plaintiff, should be made
standard practice. Present variations in practice on these and other important
matters are symptomatic of the present absence of meaningful training for
inferior court judges before they assume office.
In those civil cases sampled in which a contested trial occurred, the plain-
tiff won 78 percent of the time. The plaintiffs' advantage in these cases, often
recognized by the judges, is probably created by a number of factors: The
higher education usually possessed by business plaintiffs, the familiarity with
court procedures acquired through repeated suits, and the more frequent
representation of plaintiffs by lawyers. Other states have tried various devices
to make the parties more even-such as forbidding business associations or
assignees of a debt to sue in small claims court or forbidding lawyers to
appear.' All of these exclusionary devices have unsatisfactory repercussions.
Forbidding business associations or assignees to sue may be unfair to them
and does not prevent an individual business plaintiff from acquiring exper-
tise in small claims procedures. Banning lawyers prevents legal aid for de-
fendants. Also, issues in a suit claiming less than $1,000 can frequently be
complex enough to warrant representation of the parties by lawyers.
Perhaps the simplest and surest approach to ensuring faimess; between
parties that are unlikely to be inherently balanced in strength is to use
only lawyers or thoroughly trained laymen as judges in small claims cases
and to charge them with a clear responsibility to take an active role in ensur-
ing the full development of both sides of each case. This practice, of course,
would depart from the traditional role of the common law judge as passive
arbiter of a case brought forward solely by the adversaries. But the tradi-
tional role of the judge is ill-suited to situations in which unrepresented
parties seek informal resolution of disputes in the absence of a jury. The
characteristics of informality and the absence of lawyers or juries call instead
for the more active role characteristic of the administrative hearing officer.,"
Indeed, the present procedure for disposing of civil cases in Arizona's JP
courts may well be characterized as administrative rather than judicial be-
cause of the rarity of the traditional full-blown trial.
164. See p. 19 supra.
165. See, e.g., K. DAvis, ADmnmmns xvE LAw TEXr 194-214 (3d ed. 1V/2).
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Although the Arizona system for adjudicating small claims may be more
administrative than judicial in fact, it remains largely judicial in terms of the
procedure that the law requires. Unfortunate consequences result. For in-
stance, the actual rarity of jury demands despite formal provision for them
is probably responsible for the JP's common tendency to resort to highly
informal, and therefore highly suspect, jury selection procedures when a de-
mand does occur." ' Similarly, the statutory requirement that the rules of
procedure govern to the extent applicable.. probably causes differences in
procedure that result solely from whether the judge is a lawyer. If tech-
nical rules of law are applied by untrained laymen, the result is likely to be
unwitting violation of the law. This observation may account for the field
study's discovery that some Arizona JP's follow illegal practices in such
technical and rapidly changing areas as attachment and garnishment.
The recent increase in the maximum jurisdictional amount for civil cases
in Arizona JP courts may represent an attempt by the legislature to "solve"
problems of superior court congestion by diverting some cases to the inferior
courts. Unfortunately, this added burden on the JP courts is unaccompanied
by any financial support to aid them in meeting their newly increased respon-
sibilities. Moreover, by funneling increased numbers of civil cases involving
higher amounts in controversy into the JP courts, the legislature has increased
the impact of present actual and legal disparities between the JP courts and
the superior courts. An example of a perhaps unjustified legal disparity be-
tween these courts is the statutory provision that most kinds of civil cases
commenced in JP court may be appealed no higher than superior court;
those commenced in superior court, on the other hand, may ultimately reach
the Arizona Supreme Court.'"
Many of the foregoing observations about civil cases in Arizona JP courts
apply as well to the inferior courts' criminal cases. The criminal area is also
distinguished by a heavy preponderance of particular subject matter: traffic
cases account for 78 percent of the criminal caseload, and public drunken-
ness predominates heavily among the misdemeanors and ordinance cases.
The inferior court criminal process, like the civil process, may be characterized
as primarily administrative and managerial rather than judicial and adver-
sarial because of the rarity of contested trials in the traditional common law
sense. This characterization is neither new nor confined to the Arizona experi-
ence; the predominance of traffic cases and liquor offenses is common in
the lower criminal courts.5'
166. See p. 20 supra.
167. See p. 17 supra.
168. See Comment, Appeal from Justice Courts: Is Denial of Appeal Beyond Trial De Novo
Denial of Equal Protection?, 1973 LAW & Soc. 0. (forthcoming issue).
169. See, e.g., CRiME COMM'N REPoRT, supra note 99, at 125-30; REPORT No. 23, supra
note 162, at 7-8; Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv.
1, 61 (1964).
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The field study data did not produce a specific statistic indicating the
percentage of contested trials in inferior court criminal cases. The extremely
low acquittal rate (in terms of all cases filed) and the infrequent presence
of counsel or juries, however, suggest that contested cases are very much
the exception. Suggestions are now commonplace that minor traffic infractions
be decriminalized and made subject to administrative disposition rather than
to a theoretically judicial process."' Arizona is soon to embark on the experi-
ment of decriminalizing the offense of public drunkenness in favor of an
approach treating alcoholism as a public health problem."' This experiment
clearly seems a step in the right direction and should substantially reduce
the criminal caseload of the inferior courts.
Arizona's statutory framework for the inferior courts creates a decentral-
ized system but imposes procedural requirements on the courts that are
difficult for untrained, isolated judges to follow. The results are burdens
on the local governments and courts, difficulties in responding to changing
federal and state law, and variations in local practice on important matters,
sometimes amounting to outright violations of law. The judges were asked
to identify the main problems Arizona's inferior courts face as a system, and
their second most frequent complaint can be summarized as the presence of
various burdensome or inappropriate requirements of law-both state and
federal. Frequently cited as an example of a federally imposed burden on
the inferior courts was the requirement established by Argersinger v. Hamlin"'
that the indigent have a right to counsel before any jail sentence may be
imposed. Arizona's present inferior court system is not structured to allow
it readily to absorb major changes of this nature. The counties and cities
must respond separately, with what resources they have, to a problem
perhaps best solved by the state. Since Arizona's new drunk driving statute '
carries a mandatory one-day jail sentence for a first conviction, Argersinger
will necessitate provision for appointing defense counsel for all indigents
charged with the offense. A sharply reduced number of guilty pleas and a
concomitant greater trial burden at the inferior court level will probably
follow. Another state statutory requirement often criticized by the judges
was the provision for de novo retrial of appeals to superior court.7' This
provision in turn results from an explicit constitutional bar against changing
JP courts to courts of record.' The de novo appeals were criticized both
170. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 38 n.9 (1972); H. PAcKER, TH Lnmrrs oF
THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 142, 253 (1968).
171. See note 94 supra.
172. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
173. Amuz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-691 to -692.02 (Supp. 1972-73).
174. See note 130 supra.
175. Id.
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because they cause unnecessary duplication of effort and because they permit
someone charged with a misdemeanor to have two jury trials for the same
offense, although someone charged with a felony has only one.
In criminal cases, the field study found that local practice varied in several
important respects. Urban courts tended to secure the presence of the de-
fendant through a summons; rural courts usually issued an arrest warrant.
Jury selection practices varied and were sometimes highly informal, probably
for the reasons advanced previously to explain the same variation in civil
cases. Sentencing practices also differed: some courts followed an actively
innovative sentencing policy, and others shunned irregularities. These pro-
cedural differences may raise issues of basic fairness and of equal protection.
They can and should be rendered more nearly uniform and more reliably
fair. Apart from the foregoing instances of procedural variation, there were
strong indications that illegal awarding of "dollars or days" sentences con-
tinued, despite the mandate of Tate v. Short.'" Given the rarity of appeals
from inferior court criminal cases, there seems to be a need for more super-
vision over these courts, both to prevent abuses such as these where they
develop and to provide more help to the inferior court judges than is presently
available.
B. Reorganization
The foregoing analysis of organizational and operational deficiencies in
the Arizona inferior courts should be put in perspective. Neither the structure
of these courts nor the problems besetting them are unusual in any major
respect. State trial court systems have commonly consisted of multiple levels
of relatively uncoordinated tribunals, and the units of government main-
taining the inferior courts have often been left to fend for themselves.'" A
serious consequence is the lingering existence of "cramped and noisy court-
rooms, undignified and perfunctory procedures, and badly trained person-
nel."'" The danger is that many citizens will have their respect for the judicial
system as a whole diminished by what they observe at the first and only
point at which they ever personally contact it. The nation's widely shared
problems with the inferior courts have long received attention in the litera-
ture.!" Organizational change, however, has been slow and halting.!" Even
constitutional mandate has not always had full effect-forty years after the
176. 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
177. See generally RFPORT 23, supra note 162; AM. Jun. Soc'Y, REP. No. 12, A SELECT D
CHRONOLOGY AND BIBLIOGRAPHY OF COURT ORGANIZATION REFORM (1970).
178. CRIME COMM'N REPORT, supra note 112, at 128.
179. See generally TASK FORCE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE
REPORT: THE COURTS 29-36 (1967), and authorities cited.
180. See authorities cited note 177 supra.
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Supreme Court invalidated the fee system of compensating justices of the
peace,'"" three states were still employing it.'82
Modern studies of state court organization usually propose one of two
basic types of structure. The first, recommended by the National Conference
on the Judiciary in 1971, is as follows:
State courts should be organized into a unified judicial system
financed by and acting under the authority of the state government,
not units of local government.
They should be under the supervisory control of the supreme court
of the state, whose chief justice should be the chief executive officer
of the unified court system....
Funding by the state legislature should be adequate to provide
uniformly throughout the state the manpower, facilities and support-
ing services that are necessary to provide speedy and certain justice
to all who come before the courts.
There should be only one level of trial court, divided into districts
of manageable size. It should possess general jurisdiction, 'but be
organized into specialized departments for the handling of particular
kinds of litigation. Separate specialized courts should be abolished.
Only one appeal as of right should be allowed. It should lie only
from a final decision of the trial court and should not be. a trial de
novo, but an appeal based on the record, which should be kept in all
cases, utilizing modern recording devices.'"
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Jus-
tice has also recommended unified trial courts."4 In Arizona, unification could
offer the advantage of uniform statewide financial support to courts at even
the lowest level, thereby assuring adequate facilities and staff help and
removing current inequities in judges' salaries. Central management and
recordkeeping could promote more efficient utilization of manpower and
facilities than can a rigidly decentralized system. Specialization could mean
that judicial officers handling particular offenses, such as traffic violations,
would have qualifications and training different from those of the judges
with general trial jurisdiction."" Sensible decisions about the proper functions
to be served by nonlawyers in different areas of the state could then be
made.' " In outlying areas, qualified lay magistrates would dispose of those
matters requiring immediate resolution, leaving the remaining matters for
lawyer-judges riding circuit from the county seat."'
181. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
182. See TAsK FORCE REPORT, supra note 179, at 34. See also Callahan v. Wallace, 466
F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1972).
183. NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE JUDICIARY, JUSTICE IN THE STATES 265-66 (1971).'
184. CRME COMM'N REPORT, supra note 112, at 129-30.
185. See generally Hennessy, Qualification of California Justice Court Judges: A Dual
System, 3 PAC. L.J. 439 (1972).
186. Compare the procedures for appointing and assigning United States magistrates.
28 U.S.C. §§ 631-39 (Supp. 1972).
187. See p. 33 supra; REPORT No. 23, supra note 162, at 18.
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The second major state court organizational model is typified by the
American Bar Association's Model State Judicial Article."' This model differs
from the first proposal mainly by dividing the state's trial courts into a court
of general jurisdiction, like Arizona's superior court, and a single separate
trial court of limited jurisdiction. The state supreme court would administer
the court of limited jurisdiction and would also define its subject matter
jurisdiction by rule to avoid the rigidity of statutory specification. No im-
portant purpose seems to be served by formally bifurcating the trial courts,
however, and a unified trial court with specialized divisions seems preferable.
Full implementation of organizational reform of Arizona's inferior courts
would probably require a constitutional amendment. The Arizona Constitu-
tion provides:
The judicial power shall be vested in an integrated judicial de-
partment consisting of . . . a superior court, such courts inferior to
the superior court as may be provided by law, and justice courts."'
It further provides:
The jurisdiction, powers and duties of courts inferior to the superior
court and of justice courts ... shall be as provided by law."'
The Arizona Constitution thus gives the legislature considerable power to
reform the inferior courts, but legislation alone probably could not accomplish
all needed reforms. The constitution forbids justice of the peace courts from
becoming courts of record,"9' and the constitutional command that "[t]he
judicial power shall be vested in . . . justice courts" may prevent abolishing
the JP courts or reducing the JP's to purely ceremonial functions."' Still, the
legislature could replace the police courts with district courts of some sort,
centrally financed and administered. These could be courts of record,"" but
the jurisdiction of statutory inferior courts and justice of the peace courts is
limited to misdemeanors and civil cases involving less than $2,500."' If their
civil jurisdiction exceeds $1,000, the judges must be lawyers. ' 5
An alternative to the creation of new statutory inferior courts would be
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See genera//y K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 26-52 (3d ed. 1972). For
limits on the power of Congress to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts, see
C. WRIGnT, HANDROOK OF THE LAW OF FED RAL COURTS 22-26 (2d ed. 1970).
Cf. Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74 (1970). For
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the use of commissioners appointed by the judges of the superior court'" to
replace the city magistrates and perhaps to perform some present duties of
the JP's. The powers and duties of superior court commissioners must be
provided by statute or by rule of the Arizona Supreme Court,1 ' which has
administrative authority over all the courts of the state."" The commissioners
could be appointed and their qualifications matched to their particular duties.
Both of the foregoing possible statutory reorganizations seem clearly prefer-
able to the present Arizona inferior court system, but neither has the bene-
ficial potential of a constitutional amendment creating a fully unified trial
court.'"
196. See id. art. VI, § 24.
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199. California has had two levels of inferior trial courts since 1950 and has encountered
problems similar to those of Arizona. Extensive study has led to proposals for re-
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